THE RHODES-LIVINGSTONE JOURNAL NUMBER SIXTEEN

HUMAN PROBLEMS IN BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

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HUMAN PROBLEMS IN BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

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AFRICAN STUDIES (formerly 'Bantu Studies') is a quarterly journal that covers Linguistics, Social Anthropology, Native Administration and Native Law.

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Editors
J. CLYDE MITCHELL
ELIZABETH COLSON and MAX GLUCKMAN

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THE OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE RHODES-LIVINGSTONE INSTITUTE HEADQUARTERS IN LUSAKA

MORE than 100 guests and most of the staff of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute were present on Thursday 22nd October 1953, when His Excellency Sir Gilbert Rennie, K.C.M.G., M.C., President of the Board of Trustees, officially opened the Institute's new headquarters in Lusaka. The opening had been scheduled for 3 p.m. With the typical unpredictability of African weather the first shower of the season, the first in six months, started to fall at 3 p.m. The guests were thus obliged to sit on the narrow verandahs instead of on the spacious lawns in front of the Institute's buildings.

In introducing His Excellency, Dr. Mitchell, the Director said :

" Ladies and Gentlemen : It is my pleasant duty today to call upon the President of the Board of Trustees of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute to open these buildings.

" It is fifteen years ago since the Institute was first founded. During these years the Institute has invested its funds in research rather than buildings, and the dividend from this investment has manifested itself in the reputation the Institute has established for itself in the scientific world. Now at last, this reputation has earned its own increment in the form of these buildings.

" The Institute is primarily an academic institution devoted to the service of science. It serves British Central Africa in the same way that research departments attached to Universities serve the older established countries. Now, in some parts of the world, institutions such as these are in a precarious position. Organizations which produce unpleasant facts, as any organization must do if it is devoted to truth, are the first casualties when a totalitarian government comes into power. It is a tribute to the British way of life that fact-finding institutions such as ours should be not only permitted but encouraged. True, our researches are occasionally obstructed by people, both Africans and Europeans, who do not understand or appreciate the ideology of scientific research. But this arises, I am happy to say, from the ignorance of a few individuals and not the bigotry of a government.

" I would like to take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude for the freedom with which we have been allowed to conduct our research in the past. A special word of thanks should go, I think, to the Colonial Social Science Research Council for their support and help over the last eight years.

" Much of the credit for the achievements of the Institute over

the past fifteen years must fall to the three Directors who were my predecessors. These were the late Mr. Godfrey Wilson, Dr. Max Gluckman and Dr. Elizabeth Colson. It was they who laid the solid foundations of the research we are now conducting. It is fitting that we should have with us today Mrs. Monica Wilson, the wife of our first Director. She is herself now Professor of Social Anthropology at Cape Town University and a noted scholar in her own right. And we have with us this afternoon Dr. Desmond Clark, Curator of the now separate Rhodes-Livingstone Museum, who joined the Institute very shortly after its inception. A third old survivor is also with us—Mr. Davidson Sianga, who came to the Institute's staff very early in its career.

" I should like to take this opportunity of thanking my staff for their fine spirit of co-operation for the short time that I have been their leader. My problem, believe it or not, is not to get the work out of these people, but to stop them from working to take a rest. I should like to commend in particular my team of African research assistants who recently completed a 10 per cent social survey of the whole African population of all the Copperbelt towns and Broken Hill. They are now working in Lusaka. This is, as far as I know, the first time that a social survey on this scale has been conducted in Southern Africa. It was not easy for them to keep going in the face of many difficulties.

" It is said that research in science is sterile if each successful piece of the research does not solve one problem and pose two more. If this is true then our research is truly productive. There are vast fields of research yet to be covered and now that we have a permanent headquarters we look forward to coming to grips with them.

" But the amount of research that we can do depends on the funds available. In the past we have been exceptionally fortunate in having Sir Gilbert Rennie as our President of the Board of Trustees. It is no exaggeration to say—and I think it should be known—that it is very largely due to his personal efforts that the funds for our present scheme of research were raised. I am sure you will all be pleased to know that a few months ago it was proposed and unanimously carried in a Board meeting that our library, of which we are very proud—it is one of the best social science libraries in Southern Africa—should be called ' The Sir Gilbert Rennie Library '.

" It is not only with pleasure but with pride that I now call upon His Excellency Sir Gilbert Rennie officially to open these buildings."

His Excellency then spoke :

" Dr. Mitchell, Ladies and Gentlemen : My pleasant duty this afternoon is to welcome you here, and to say a few words about the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and its affairs before I declare its new headquarters open. A brief account of the history of the Institute will give you the background of today's ceremony.

" The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Ordinance was enacted in 1937. At that time the Institute and the Museum were regulated by the one Ordinance and by the one Board of Trustees. The Institute started in quite a small way ; it had to rely on local funds and these were not large. During the war the Institute continued to function, but like every other organization not directly involved in the war, it was short of staff and had to reduce its activities accordingly.

" When the war finished, more funds and more staff became available and in 1946 the Institute and the Museum became separate bodies regulated by separate Ordinances. The Institute then moved to an old building in Livingstone near the High Court. Later this building was dismantled and re-erected elsewhere in the town. However, the building was inadequate for the Institute and, in addition, because of the shortage of accommodation in Livingstone, the Institute had to share the building with a Government department.

" In 1947 the then Director, Dr. Gluckman, in consultation with Dr. Colson, who became Director in 1948, and others interested in the peoples of Central Africa, worked out a co-ordinated five-year research scheme for the Institute. This scheme was ambitious and it relied very largely on assistance from Colonial Welfare and Development Funds. I should perhaps mention here that the Institute has been receiving help under the Colonial Welfare and Development Act since 1944.

" The five-year scheme was approved at the end of 1949, and its first year of operation was 1950. The capital expenditure involved, £29,000, is financed entirely by the Colonial Development and Welfare Vote and was designed to meet the costs of building the new headquarters here at Lusaka. All the buildings we see here today, either built or still in the course of construction, owe their existence to the generosity of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in making this large sum of money available. The Trustees of the Institute would wish me to express today our great appreciation of this very generous grant, which has enabled the Institute to have suitable headquarters, and the Director and the Administrative Secretary suitable houses near their work.

" The capital expenditure is less than one-quarter of the total cost of the scheme. The recurrent expenditure is estimated at approximately £100,000 of which 70 per cent is contributed by the United Kingdom Government and 30 per cent from other sources including the copper-mining companies, the Broken Hill Development Corporation, the British South Africa Company and the Governments of East and Central Africa. To all these, and especially to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, who have contributed so very generously, and to the Government of Northern Rhodesia which has also made large contributions, I would express the warm thanks of the Trustees.

" I am sure that you would like me to say a few words in simple language about the work of the Institute. Anthropology and sociology are long words which often do not convey a great deal. The object of the Institute's work is to conduct a series of related researches into the life and customs of the peoples in Central Africa. The field work which the research officers of the Institute carry out is very important. In every country there is a continually changing pattern of society. In Africa generally, and in Central Africa particularly, with its multi-racial society, where the impact of the European on the indigenous people is largely determining the form of the new pattern of society in each country, it is very important that we should know as much as possible about the individual tribes in the country and also how these tribes are reacting to the impact of Western civilization. It is difficult to determine a proper course of political, social and economic action for the future without having adequate knowledge of the country and of its people. The collection and presentation of adequate background information, so essential for a proper appreciation of any situation, is the main task of the research officers of the Institute. Many of us think we know the African, but how many of us really do ? The reports that the Institute has published help us to understand the various tribes and their customs a great deal better. In particular, members of the Provincial Administration find these reports of great value in their everyday contact with Africans. I don't wish to blow the Institute's trumpet too loudly today, but I think you should know that this Institute was the first of its kind in the Empire ; that other Institutes have recently been established in several other countries on the pattern of this Institute ; and that the Institute has earned a very big reputation in International circles for its work.

" The work of building this new headquarters started at the end of 1951 with the placing of the first contract. The main buildings were completed just over a year ago. The Administrative Secretary of the Institute moved to Lusaka in November 1952, and this has been the headquarters of the Institute since that date. I should like to congratulate the Director and his staff on the work they have done here in the past eleven months to improve the grounds and generally put the place in good order. A certain amount of building is still going on, but it is hoped this will all be finished shortly.

" I should like also to thank the architects, and especially Mr. MacLaurin, who has taken a very keen personal interest in the project, the quantity surveyors and the contractors for their good work, and for the speedy way in which the buildings were put up. I may add that the Trustees, realizing that in these days actual costs often bear only a slight resemblance to the original estimates, have proceeded cautiously and cut their coat according to their cloth. Although all the buildings have not yet been completed and it is difficult therefore to state exactly what the final costs

will be, it is estimated that the costs of the buildings including equipment and furniture will be slightly under the £29,000 provided for the purpose.

" Before I declare the headquarters open, I should like to say one last word of thanks. The Rhokana Corporation Ltd. has made and presented to the Institute this commemorative plaque, which is a tribute not only to the Corporation's generosity but also to its standard of workmanship. The Board of Trustees are very grateful indeed for this kindness.

" I now have much pleasure in declaring open the new headquarters of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute."

His Excellency then unveiled the plaque which bore the wording :

THIS BUILDING
THE COST OF WHICH WAS MET BY A GENEROUS
GRANT BY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM COLONIAL
DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE FUNDS
WAS OPENED ON 22nd OCTOBER 1953 BY
HIS EXCELLENCY SIR GILBERT RENNIE K.C.M.G., M.C
GOVERNOR OF NORTHERN RHODESIA
AND PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
THE RHODES-LIVINGSTONE INSTITUTE

After this he opened the door of the " Sir Gilbert Rennie Library ".

The guests now had an opportunity to inspect the library. The rain had now stopped and the guests were able to enjoy refreshments in the shade of the Brachystegia on the lawn.

SUCCESSION AND CIVIL WAR AMONG THE BEMBA—AN EXERCISE IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY [1]

by

MAX GLUCKMAN

IN their introduction to *African Political Systems*, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard state :

A relatively stable political system in Africa presents a balance between conflicting tendencies and between divergent interests. In Group A [a group of societies " which have centralized authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions . . . and in which cleavages of wealth, privilege and status correspond to the distribution of power and authority "] it is a balance between different parts of the administrative organization. The forces that maintain the supremacy of the paramount ruler are opposed by the forces that act as a check on his powers. . . . The regional devolution of powers and privileges, necessary on account of difficulties of communication and transport and of other cultural deficiencies, imposes severe restrictions on a king's authority. The balance between central authority and regional autonomy is a very important element in the political structure. If a king abuses his power, subordinate chiefs are liable to secede or to lead a revolt against him. If a subordinate chief seems to be getting too powerful and independent, the central authority will be supported by other subordinate chiefs in suppressing him.

It would be a mistake to regard the scheme of constitutional checks and balances and the delegation of power and authority to regional chiefs as nothing more than an administrative device. A general principle of great importance is contained in these arrangements, which has the effect of giving every section and every major interest of the society direct or indirect representation in the conduct of government. Local chiefs represent the central authority in relation to their districts, but they also represent the people under them in relation to the central authority. . . .

A different kind of balance is found in societies of Group B [" societies which lack centralized authority, administrative machinery, and constituted judicial institutions . . . and in which there are no cleavages of rank, status or wealth "]. It is an equilibrium between a number of segments, spatially juxtaposed and structurally equivalent, which are defined in local and lineage, not in administrative terms. Every segment has the same interest as other segments of a like order. The set of inter-

[1] This paper was read by Professor Gluckman to a conference of research officers of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Livingstone in 1947. He was then Director of the Institute. Professor Gluckman never offered this paper for publication and it has been on the Institute's files ever since. A short while ago Mr. Epstein, a recently appointed officer who was making a short field trip to the Bemba, unearthed the paper and Professor Gluckman has given us his permission to publish it.

segmentary relations that constitutes the political structure is a balance of opposed loyalties and of divergent lineage and ritual ties . . . divergence of interests between the component segments is intrinsic to the political structure . . . the stabilizing factor is not a superordinate juridical or military organization, but is simply the sum total of inter-segment relations.[1]

Fortes and Evans-Pritchard themselves in the same book described the political systems of the peoples they had studied, the Tallensi and the Nuer, respectively. I myself wrote there on the Zulu, and said of the organization of the Zulu nation into sections (which I called tribes):

the tribes and smaller groups [were] part of a pyramidal organization with the king at the top. . . . [The] administrative framework . . . ran through the social groupings, but the position of the head of each group in the series was different, for he was related to the members of his group by different ties from these linking them to the head of the larger group of which it was part. . . . The nation was a federation of tribes whose separate identities were symbolized by their chiefs. The tribes were even autonomous within the national organization for on occasion many tribesmen supported their chiefs in quarrels with the king, though some were swayed by national loyalties.[2]

In a later article I saw more clearly the social processes at work. I described how the Zulu nation was created by a small tribe, the Zulu, coming to dominate all the other small tribes of south-eastern Africa. The nation was divided into groups (which I still called tribes), which were based on these old units.

Between tribes there continued a balancing of tribal chief against tribal chief; for the chief was not only part of the administrative machinery in which he represented the state power, but also the centre of his tribe's unity for which he stood against the state and other tribes within it. Within a tribe, relatives of the chief, or men in charge of political districts, could still attain independence by winning people away from the chief, subject to the king's intervention. It is suggested that under the conditions of communication prevailing over the vast Zulu territory, the nation was stable as its component units were hostile. A tyrannous king would unite the tribes against him, but they combined under the king to prevent any tribe becoming too powerful. This was also achieved by the continued fission of tribes which was partly due to the spread of the increasing population over fresh arable and grazing land, partly to the conflicting groups within each tribe, and partly to the creation by the king of new tribes under his relatives and other rising important men. In the early Nguni period [the period of small, continually splitting tribes] fission of tribes prevented the growth of a centralized government; here it strengthened the centralized government by keeping down the strength of each tribe.

The divergent interests of groups within the nation were balanced by

[1] *African Political Systems*, ed. by M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Oxford University Press, London (1940), pp. 11–14, and p. 5.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 39–40.

their common allegiance to the king and the values he symbolized, by the regimental system, and by the administrative machinery which worked through delegated authority, with lessening executive power, in a pyramidal organization from nation, to tribe, to tribal district, to homestead. These separate chains of administration were linked in a council system in which homestead headmen united under their district head, district heads under their chief, and chiefs under the king.

The second important point here is that

any threat to the king came from members of the royal family, some of whom were established as chiefs. . . . Intriguers for power sought popular support and the people turned to those men who were near in power to their rulers to escape from intolerable oppression. The political balance persisted so long as the ruler observed the norms of rule and the values accepted by the subject. When he transgressed these rules, his subjects knew of no other political system, nor could they establish another under the social conditions then prevailing. They could be rebels not revolutionaries. The king's danger came from rivals who could be installed in his place, with similar powers in a similar organization; he was deposed, but his office remained unaffected, as is shown in the ability of his successor immediately to undertake religious functions, to symbolize the values of the society and express them in ceremonial.

And a deposed, or assassinated, tyrant after his death became a guardian spirit of the tribe.[1]

The theory underlying this argument is that societies which have a stagnant techno-economy have conflicts which can be resolved by changing the individuals occupying office or in relationship with one another, without changing the pattern of the offices or relationships. Politically, it means that a rebellion changes the king, but does not affect the kingship—nay, may even strengthen the kingship, against a tyrant who has broken its norms. Secondly, it means that the territorial sections of a kingdom struggle against the central power and each other, without disrupting the central authority. The point in the above quotation which I wish to emphasize is the statement that "the nation was stable as its component sections were hostile" to one another. In this essay I propose to apply this theory to a certain minimum of facts I have about Bemba political structure. Evans-Pritchard has analysed these segmentary tendencies in the political systems of two tribes without a centralized national organization: the Nuer and the Anuak.[2] Fortes has also dealt with the segmentary tendencies in the Tallensi system, which also is not nationally organized. I must emphasize that they show that the segmentary tendency does not mean that the system is characterized by continual division only.

[1] Gluckman, "Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand: B. Social Change in Zululand", *Bantu Studies* (June 1940), pp. 152–3. See also *African Political Systems*, Introduction, p. 13.

[2] *The Nuer*, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1940), and *The Political System of the Anuak of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, Percy Lund & Humphries, London (1940). *The Nuer* also in *African Political Systems*, in which see Fortes on the Tallensi.

A [Nuer] tribe is an examplification of a segmentary tendency which is characteristic of the political structure as a whole. The reason why we speak of Nuer political groups, and of the tribe in particular, as relative groups and state that they are not easily described in terms of political morphology, is that political relations are dynamic. They are always changing in one direction or another. The most evident movement is towards fission. The tendency of tribes and tribal sections towards fission and internal opposition between their parts is balanced by a tendency in the direction of fusion, of the combination or amalgamation of groups. This tendency towards fusion is inherent in the segmentary character of Nuer political structure, for, although any group tends to split into opposed parts, these parts tend to fuse in relation to other groups. Here fission and fusion are two aspects of the same segmentary principle and the Nuer tribe and its divisions are to be understood as a relation between these two contradictory, yet complementary, tendencies. Physical environment, way of livelihood, mode of distribution, poor communications, simple economy, etc., to some extent explain the incidence of political cleavage, but the tendency towards segmentation seems to be inherent in political structure itself.[1]

On the Anuak he says:

There are two types of Anuak political system. In the one type, there are isolated villages ruled by headmen with no superior political head over them. The headmanships are restricted to members of a certain lineage whose fathers held the posts before them. Cleavages within a village community operate through ostracism of a headman and the practice prevents despotism while preserving intact the prestige of the headmanship. In the other Anuak type, the villages are not exclusive as in the first. All the villages in the eastern type recognize a single king and the noble rulers of the different villages all belong to the same clan and can therefore be substituted for one another in any village of the area. . . . All the villages . . . have a common interest in the kingship, and it is this common interest which relates them to one another in a political organization.

. . . We may speak of an inter-village organization with the emblems [of kingship] as its integrative element. The villages are politically independent, but they are not, as in the west, politically isolated. They participate in a polity, a kind of inter-village league. Fighting between villages [for the emblems to make their own noble, king] has not the sole effect of maintaining their exclusiveness in relation to one another, but has also the effect of maintaining the organization as a whole. The struggle for the emblems enhances their prestige, and, since the emblems represent the unity of the organization, it serves to preserve this unity.[2]

Fortes says of the Tallensi:

jural notions and procedures are in conformity with the elaborately segmented character of the social structure. As there was formerly no completely dominant social unit or association, there could be no constituted legal machinery backed by irresistible force. Every region of Tale society, from the joint family to the whole vaguely delimited aggregate

[1] Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems*, p. 284.
[2] Evans-Pritchard, *Political System of the Anuak*, pp. 134–5.

known as the Tallensi, exhibits a dynamic equilibrium of like units balanced against one another, of counterpoised ties and cleavages, of complementary institutions and ideological notions. . . . Tension is implicit in the equilibrium. It might explode violently when the specific interests of a unit were violated. But conflict could never develop to the point of bringing about complete disintegration.

Fortes cites various

factors restricting conflict and promoting the restoration of equilibrium . . . Social relationships fluctuate between unity and discord, co-operation and conflict, for forces engendering both are always active ; but in the long run an equilibrium is maintained. The political system of the Tallensi hinges on this principle.[1]

Unfortunately, Evans-Pritchard has not yet published his analysis of the political system of the highly organized Azande. Most writers on highly organized societies recognize the existence of cleavages in the political system, but I do not consider that they sufficiently appreciate that in this type of political system, in indigenous Africa, the cleavages are an aspect of the integration of the political system. I have stressed this in my study of the Zulu, cited above, and Nadel has emphasized it in a study of the Nupe of Nigeria, where succession to the Emirate passes between three dynasties of the royal family.[2] Recently, when I was requested to look over certain data on the Bemba kingship, I was struck with certain anomalies in the data presented to me, which I considered could best be explained by applying the theory of cleavages —co-operation, of the segmentary principle of fission-fusion. By applying this theory to the facts presented to me, I was able to state that I was certain that in parts of Bemba history on which I had no data, certain recurrent facts would be found. It therefore occurred to me that it would be an interesting test of the theory to set out clearly the manner in which I applied the theory to the facts I have, before testing it on the facts not yet known by me.

The facts available were in Richards' essay on " The Political System of the Bemba Tribe " in *African Political Systems*, and in a manuscript on *The Succession of Bemba Chiefs* by Vernon Brelsford (District Officer) which I was shown by the Secretary for Native Affairs, Northern Rhodesia Government. It is shortly to be published.[3] Mr. Brelsford has sent me some additional notes but I must stress that neither of these writers was concerned with the problem I am setting here, and I am dependent entirely on the data they supply. I begin by setting out the basic points in the data available, and then apply the theory set out above, to them. A major interest in this exercise is that the theory is applied for the first time to an African political system based on matrilineal

[1] Fortes, *African Political Systems*, p. 271.

[2] *A Black Byzantium*, Oxford University Press, London (1942).

[3] Subsequently published as the *Succession of Bemba Chiefs : a Guide for District Officers*, Government Printer, Lusaka (1948).

succession. Nuer, Tallensi, Nupe, Zulu, and others about whom the point has been made before are all patrilineal.

I first set out briefly the history of Bemba chieftainship through the reigns of the last eight kings. Most of the material is shown in the genealogical table (at pp. 24–5) (after Brelsford, but cf. Richards in *African Political Systems*, p. 102).[1] Then I draw the deductions from facts on the basis of the general theory.

Bemba laws of succession to the kingship and their organization into chieftainships may be summed up as:

(1) the nation is divided into a number of chieftainships on a territorial basis, under a king who himself rules a large area;

(2) the title of the kingship (CITIMUKULU) is inherited by each king, as are the titles of the subordinate chieftainships (MWAMBA, NKULA, NKOLEMFUMU, MPEPO, CHIKWANDA, CEWE, SHIMUMBI);

(3) the king and these chiefs are all members of one matrilineal clan, and succession to the kingship and these chieftainships pass through a generation of brothers by one mother, and then to their "brothers" (in Bemba terminology) by their mother's next senior sister, after which it drops to their nephews by their own sisters in order of genealogical seniority of the sisters; after passing through the sons of two or three sisters succession again drops a generation to the uterine nephew by the most senior sister;

(4) men thus pass from one chieftainship to another on their way to the throne, but the actual chieftainship held is irrelevant to the right to succeed to the kingship: what counts is genealogical seniority;

(5) there are a number of chieftainships held by sons of chiefs, to which succession is by the sons of the senior male of the royal family;

(6) in addition to these chieftainships, there are two important female chiefs' titles (*CANDAMUKULU* and *MUKUKAMFUMU*) which are said to give the right to bear kings; succession to these is from sister to sister and then to uterine granddaughter, but failing a granddaughter, a daughter may be appointed.

II

About the year 1850 the king of Bembaland was Çimbola (A7), whose mother held the title *CANDAMUKULU*. One of his senior chiefs [title ?] was Cileshe (A2), who ruled in a part of the country where he got much ivory. His mother held the title *MUKUKAMFUMU*. I do not know what the genealogical connection between Cimbola

[1] Females in italics; chieftainships in capitals, with chieftainships held by women in italicized capitals; numbers A1, etc., refer to genealogical chart.

and Cileshe was. The people of Cimbola (A7) envied those of Cileshe (A2) their chief's wealth in ivory, and they informed Cileshe that if he attacked the king, they would shoot fake arrows at him. He attacked, drove out Cimbola, and took the title of CITIMUKULU (" I " in this lineage). Later he recalled Cimbola and gave him a chieftainship, principally with ritual status, with the title CHIMBOLA. He changed the title of Cimbola's mother from *CANDAMUKULU* to *CANDAWEYAYA* so that it would be clear that she could not bear a king. We are told that he gave the title of *CANDAMUKULU* to his mother (previously *MUKUKAMFUMU*), but on the table *CANDAMUKULU I* is shown as his elder sister, *Cilufya* (A1).

I do not know at present whether other relatives of Cimbola (A7), closer to him than Cileshe (A2), had held the other big subordinate chieftainships, but Cileshe presumably appointed his full-brother, next to him, Citundu (A3) to the big MWAMBAship. Assuming that his next brother, Kalulu (A5), was dead, Cileshe seems to have passed over Bwembya (A6) for a chieftainship, though Bwembya became king as CITIMUKULU II. Bwembya was almost dumb and a fool. Since succession passes from brother to brother, Citundu (A3) must have died as MWAMBA I, before his brother CITIMUKULU I Cileshe (A2) died. Again, Bwembya (A6) was passed over, and the MWAMBAship dropped to the senior nephew, Kapalaula (B3).

For the female titles, I gather from the table that CITIMUKULU I's (A2) mother retained the title *MUKUKAMFUMU*, and the title *CANDAMUKULU* was given to his older sister, *Cilufya* (A1). I assume that the second sister, *Kanyanta* (A4), in this generation died before her sister *Cilufya* (A1) for she did not get the title *CANDAMUKULU*. This passed according to the rule stated to *Cilufya*'s (A1) eldest own uterine granddaughter, *Kangwa Conya* (C4), while the *MUKUKAMFUMU*ship passed to the eldest (presumably surviving) uterine granddaughter of Cileshe's (A1) mother, *MUKUKAMFUMU I*, i.e. to *Kasonde* (B2).

When CITIMUKULU I (A2) died he was succeeded by his presumably eldest surviving brother, Bwembya (A6), as CITIMUKULU II, despite his handicaps, " probably because of [the paramountcy's] spiritual importance ", though he had been passed over for MWAMBA.

Reign of CITIMUKULU III (B4) *:*

Citapankwa (B4), a wild fighting fellow, drove out the deficient Bwembya and seized the throne as CITIMUKULU III, so that his elder brother Kapalaula (B3) MWAMBA II did not succeed. Citapankwa created the title NKULA for his younger brother, Sampa (B6). When Kapalaula (B3) MWAMBA II died, his classificatory brother Cimfwembe (B7) did not succeed, but instead his eldest living nephew, Mubanga (C2). But it is possible that Kapalaula (B3) died after CITIMUKULU III (B4) and IV (B5) and if a man has been passed over he does not re-enter the lists ; so that the succession was regular. It is possible that *MUKUKAMFUMU II, Kasonde* (B2), may have died

in this reign. Presumably she died after her sister, *Nakasafya* (B5), who should otherwise have become *MUKUKAMFUMU* after her elder sister *Kasonde*. For some reason the *MUKUKAMFUMU*ship then did not pass to a granddaughter, but went to the younger sister's eldest daughter, *Mwendecanda* (C8), who became *MUKUKAMFUMU III*.

When CITIMUKULU III (B4) died he was regularly succeeded by his next brother, Sampa (B6), as king CITIMUKULU IV. This meant that Sampa abandoned the title NKULA, but for some reason this did not pass to the next senior male, Cimfwembe (B7), but dropped a generation to Mutale (C3), who became NKULA II. As we have seen, Mutale's elder brother (Mubanga, C2) may already have been appointed MWAMBA III, the eldest brother (Canda, C1) presumably being already dead.

Reign of CITIMUKULU IV (B6) *:*

When CITIMUKULU IV (B6) died, he was correctly succeeded by his collateral brother (B7) to be CITIMUKULU V, though he had no title before. Note that as there were no daughters among this man's siblings, and his younger brother (Mulenga, B8) was presumably already dead, this house ends with CITIMUKULU V.

Reign of CITIMUKULU V *:*

This reign brought varied fortunes to the royal family. Mutale (C3) NKULA II seems to have died first (though Richards shows him as MWAMBA IV—but she also shows Kanyanta (D1) as MWAMBA IV). If NKULA II thus died first, he was correctly succeeded by Cikwanda (C6) as NKULA III, since this man was the eldest son of the second senior sister in the preceding generation. CIKWANDA seems to be a title as well as a name, and the holder ruled at Mpika. NKULA III (C6) hankered for the salt-licks of Mpika, so he gave up the NKULAship and returned to the CIKWANDAship. But while he was NKULA, Mubanga (C2) who was MWAMBA III had died. Cikwanda (C6) NKULA III refused the MWAMBAship, since the two titles are almost equal, and his younger brother Ponde (C10) was then entitled to the MWAMBAship, since their three other brothers had died violent deaths previously. But the other house accused Ponde of killing the recently deceased MWAMBA (C2). The Administration was called in, Ponde resisted, and was banished. Therefore the title MWAMBA dropped to the senior nephew, Kanyanta (D1), who rose from NKOLEMFUMU to be MWAMBA IV and was succeeded as NKOLEMFUMU by his younger brother (name ?—D3). Presumably Luatila (D2) was already dead. These men were sons of the senior woman in generation C, *Kangwa CANDAMUKULU II* (C4). When Cikwanda (C6) gave up the NKULAship, his brother Ponde (C10) refused it though he had reinstated himself in the nation ; it is said that he had more power behind the throne of CITIMUKULU V (B7) whose favourite he was. By doing this he did not lose his right to the kingship, because for succession to that it is irrelevant what title

was held before, or if none was held. Ponde (C10) had sufficient sway with CITIMUKULU V (B7), to wrench the succession to the NKULAship from the then NKOLEMFUMU III (D3), who was the next senior nephew, and to get appointed as NKULA IV his nephew (Bwalya, D12) by his own full-sister *Mwendecanda* (C8) *MUKUKAMFUMU III*.

On the death of CITIMUKULU V (B7), since none of the sons of the senior sister *Kasonde* (B2) were still alive, the eldest son of the second sister, *Nakasafya* (B5), who was Cikwanda (C6), though he had abandoned the NKULAship and refused the MWAMBAship, became king as CITIMUKULU VI. This was in 1911, and when he died in 1917 his brother Ponde (C10), who had refused the NKULAship, became CITIMUKULU VII. When he died in 1922, all the men of that generation were dead, and a dispute ensued about the succession.

The Appointment of CITIMUKULU VIII *:*

The two claimants for the kingship were Kanyanta (D1) MWAMBA IV and Bwalya (D12) NKULA IV. Kanyanta's argument was that he was the senior son of the senior sister in the preceding generation, and there is a suggestion that his side argued that the holder of the MWAMBAship always became king. Bwalya countered that the succession of CITIMUKULU V (B7), CITIMUKULU VI (C6), and CITIMUKULU VII (C10) had shifted the paramountcy into the house of *Nakasafya* (B5). Bwalya (D12) seems to have been the stronger man, and possibly in the old days there would have been war. Government enquired into the succession, and appointed Kanyanta (D1) as CITIMUKULU VIII, in 1924.

Reign of CITIMUKULU VIII (D1) *:*

CITIMUKULU VIII thus left the MWAMBAship, and was succeeded as MWAMBA by his next brother living (D3), who left the NKOLEMFUMUship to become MWAMBA V. Their youngest full-brother Mbonkali (D5) left the MPEPOship to become NKOLEMFUMU IV, and the MPEPOship passed to the eldest son of their mother's next full-sister, *Cimbabantu* (C5), who at some time unspecified had correctly succeeded her sister *Kangwa* (C4) to become *CANDAMUKULU III*. When Mbonkali (D5) died in 1942 while holding the NKOLEMFUMUship, Musenga (D6), who had been MPEPO, became NKOLEMFUMU V and his younger brother Mutale (D10) became MPEPO.

Meanwhile, in the other house of *Nakasafya* (B5), NKULA IV (D12) had died in 1934. His house was successful in asserting a prerogative claim to fill the NKULAship, for the house of *Kasonde* (B2) which was holding the kingship and the MWAMBAship does not seem to have disputed the succession : the next brother to the dead NKULA, in that house, Musungu (D14) became NKULA V. This house also seems to have established its right to the CIKWANDAship and the SHIMUMBIship. Presumably the family was too strongly

entrenched in the NKULA area for the CITIMUKULU VIII (D1) to try to put in one of his closer relatives, for by genealogical descent, Mbonkali (D5), then still alive, was senior to Musungu (D14); or else the Ponde's (C10) intrigue in getting his own nephew made NKULA IV (i.e. D12) cast the senior branch out of the NKULA succession.

Meanwhile, *Mwendecanda* (C8) *MUKUKAMFUMU III* died in 1930, and she was succeeded by the eldest daughter of her eldest daughter, viz. by *Nkumbula* (E10) who became *MUKUKAMFUMU IV*. This was a perfectly regular succession, but there is some confusion since, probably to join her mother's brother, *MUKUKAMFUMU III* (C8) left her site in Kasama and went to Chinsali. Her daughter *Nankumbula* (D13) followed her, and there is some story of CITIMUKULU VIII's attempting to make a very junior female in the other house, viz. Sampa (D22), into *MUKUKAMFUMU IV*. He failed to do so.

Cimbabantu (C5) *CANDAMUKULU III* died in 1937, and as the only (grown ?) granddaughter was mad, she was succeeded by her eldest daughter *Chabili* (D7) as *CANDAMUKULU IV*, since *Cilufya* (D4), the eldest daughter in that house by the older sister (C4), was presumably already dead.

Death of CITIMUKULU VIII (D1) *and the Succession Problem:*

Government recognized Kanyanta's (D1) right to become CITIMUKULU VIII before Bwalya's (D12) on the grounds that he was the senior son of the senior sister in the preceding generation, and this is borne out by the formulations of the law of succession given to Brelsford and Richards, and by the actual succession within this lineage. The senior living son of the senior woman in the preceding generation has succeeded regularly to the kingship, though succession to the other big chieftainships, MWAMBA and NKULA, has been far from regular. CITIMUKULU VIII (D1) died in 1943, and on this rule the succession should pass to his next brother MWAMBA V (D3), who however is old and unlikely to take it.[1] The next brother Mbonkali (D5) died in 1942, so there is now a dispute between the sons of *CANDAMUKULU III* (C5) on one hand and NKULA V (D14) on the other, for the throne. *CANDAMUKULU III* was seized by the Ngoni and the father of her sons was an Ngoni. *Mwendecanda* (C8) *MUKUKAMFUMU III* was probably older than *CANDAMUKULU III* (C5), but there is no doubt that legally the children of *CANDAMUKULU III* have the superior claim. Therefore the NKULA V (D14) party is objecting to the succession of her sons on the grounds that they are not pure Bemba, since their father was an Ngoni. This is the position at present, and again there is little doubt that were it not for the presence of the Government, war would have decided the matter.

[1] He did take the kingship, but died within the year. NKULA V (D14) succeeded him with Government support, not Musenga (D6), who had become MWAMBA VI!

III

In addition to these chieftainships inherited matrilineally there are a number of chieftainships which are succeeded to by chiefs' sons. The most important is the MAKASAship, for MAKASA plays a dominant role in the inheritance ceremonies of the CITIMUKULU. Others are MPOROKOSO, MUBANGA, MISENGO. In the election of men to these posts, genealogical seniority should count, but there is a constant struggle by important chiefs to get their own sons in, and while this is greatest between the two branches of the lineage, it also occurs within these branches.

IV

The problem of the relative status of the *CANDAMUKULU* and *MUKUKAMFUMU* titles is complicated. Richards (at p. 93) definitely states that " the mother of the paramount is highly honoured, succeeds to a fixed title—the *CANDAMUKULU*—takes part in tribal councils, and has several villages of her own ". Outside of the table (at p. 103) she does not mention the title *MUKUKAMFUMU* at all. Her implication that the woman becomes *CANDAMUKULU* after her son becomes king is not borne out by the facts ; nor is it correct if she means that only a woman who had the title *CANDAMUKULU* could bear a king ; for both *Kanyanta Bwalya Cabula* (A4) and *Nakasafya* (B5) bore kings without recorded titles, and there is little doubt that if the sons of *Kasonde* (B2) *MUKUKAMFUMU II* had lived they would have become king.

On the other hand, Brelsford says that the titles *CANDAMUKULU* and *MUKUKAMFUMU* are equal in status ; there is therefore no promotion from one to the other, for that would be pointless. Both titles carry the right to bear kings (or, as we have seen, no title may be held by the mother of a king, who possibly has died before her turn to succeed comes). Brelsford states, presumably on Bemba authority, that the two senior sisters, *CANDAMUKULU* and *MUKUKAMFUMU*, bear kings. Yet in fact *MUKUKAMFUMU III* (C8) was already genealogically the third senior sister, with C4 and C5 above her on the table, and there are many women above *MUKUKAMFUMU IV* (E10). In fact, the rule that a uterine granddaughter, and not a daughter herself, should succeed to these female titles, is very significant, because it carries the possibility that daughters without these titles will have the right to bear kings and chiefs before the granddaughters who have the titles ; as *Nakasafya* (B5) did before her daughter *MUKUKAMFUMU III* (C8). I shall revert again to this confusion in the female descent principles, for in this matrilineal nation it is the crux of the problem.

The three major chieftainships are the CITIMUKULUship, the MWAMBAship, and the NKULAship. Both writers agree that the

MWAMBA and the NKULA are almost equal in temporal, though not in ritual, status with the CITIMUKULU. Thus Richards writes:

> Naturally the ritual and political organization of the paramount's capital is more elaborate than that of his inferiors, but even the smallest sub-chief maintains his miniature court and tries to ape the state of those above him, while the bigger territorial chiefs sometimes rivalled the power of the Citimukulu in the old days.

Brelsford says that MWAMBA and NKULA are almost equal in temporal power with the CITIMUKULU, but ritually he is their superior.

V

The lessons of the last eight reigns may be summed up thus:

(1) The CITIMUKULUship has passed regularly according to the rules of succession, from brother to brother in a genealogical generation; and when that horizontal line was exhausted it dropped to the oldest nephew of the senior woman in that generation; and when her sons were exhausted, it passed to the sons of the woman nearest in seniority to her. After that it has dropped another generation, for in this lineage there were not more than two productive full or classificatory sisters in one generation, until the third (C), that which has produced rival claimants to the throne. There is but one exception to this rule of succession to the CITIMUKULUship, when Citapankwa (B4) seized it out of turn, but no man has been passed over, even on the grounds of incapacity—not even the fool Bwembya (A6). Those on the table who might have succeeded and did not, had all died before their turn came, except Kapalaula (B3). It is quite clear that the title held by a man previously was irrelevant, for many succeeded without having held a previous title.[1] There is therefore no doubt that the order of succession should now be: The present MWAMBA (D3), then the present NKOLEMFUMU (D6), then the present MPEPO (D10). This is assuming that the fact that they are half-Ngoni does not count legally, though it is important politically. Brelsford and Richards both stress that it is only the womb from which a man comes that counts for his rights to succeed, and his father is irrelevant. Richards implies that even illegitimacy would not bar a man's claim.

Has NKULA V (D14) any claim? Brelsford says "yes", for he speaks of his mother *Mwendecanda* (C8) *MUKUKAMFUMU III* as the second senior sister, when in fact she is third senior sister, if it is the genealogical position, and not date of birth, of the woman that counts. To this point we shall return later. However, even if NKULA V (D14) has no legal claim, in practice he has a strong one. I must repeat that the problem of the third sister's sons has not

[1] Richards (at p. 101) says that Kanyanta (D1) claimed the throne on the grounds that he came of an older line (which legally seems a sound argument) and that MWAMBA always became king (which from the table is clearly incorrect).

arisen before in this lineage ; Brelsford says there have been many third senior sisters in other royal lineages in the past and their sons have never succeeded.

(2) Though the CITIMUKULUship has thus gone regularly, the MWAMBAship and NKULAship have not. Most of the irregularities in generations C and D are explained by the machinations of Ponde (C10) and his elder brother Cikwanda's (C6) liking for salt. A6 was passed over deliberately ; B4 seized the kingship before he was due to be a chief. It is not clear why B7 held no chieftainship. After generation B the MWAMBAship seems to have run regularly. On the death of Mubanga (C2) MWAMBA III, it was offered to his next oldest " brother ", Cikwanda (C6), who was then NKULA, but he refused the MWAMBAship as NKULA is equal to MWAMBA. His next brother Ponde (C10) tried to get the MWAMBAship, and had entered the MWAMBA country to take it, but was rejected by the other branch of the family on the grounds that he had killed the late MWAMBA (C2) by witchcraft. Therefore it dropped to the oldest nephew, Kanyanta (D1), and from him it went to his younger brother. The same may be said of the NKULAship, once it had passed from the senior branch of C generation to the junior branch when Ponde (C10) got his own nephew appointed instead of his classificatory nephew, D3. Since then it seems accepted that the NKULAship runs in the junior line.

VI

The crux of the succession is the status of the royal women, and this gives the territorial cleavage a particular form. Richards and Brelsford are agreed that succession is to the sons of the senior woman in any generation, but while Richards says that the mother of the Paramount becomes *CANDAMUKULU*, Brelsford definitely states : " whether the line passes through only the two elder sisters, Candamukulu and Mukukamfumu, or whether also through any third sister is a point which will be discussed later "—when he says it does not. But he clearly implies that the two senior (not necessarily elder) sisters hold the titles *CANDAMUKULU* and *MUKUKAMFUMU*, though in fact *MUKUKAMFUMU III* (C8) is already a " third " sister, and *MUKUKAMFUMU IV* has six classificatory sisters genealogically senior to her.

I believe that the statements on this point made by Richards and Brelsford are correct recordings of statements of Bemba law, and that the inconsistency between them is the symbol of the line of Bemba political cleavage. There is a definite conflict arising out of three rules rooted in the Bemba matrilineal succession :

(1) The succession through brothers, full and classificatory, born of a group of sisters, in order of genealogical seniority, to a number of chieftainships of ascending status up to the kingship ;

(2) the succession to the titles of chieftainesses through full-sisters and then to uterine granddaughters ; and
(3) the titles *CANDAMUKULU* and *MUKUKAMFUMU* carry the right to bear the king.

To these rules, we must add the fact that MWAMBA and NKULA have the power to influence the succession.

If we examine the table, we can see at once how the inconsistency between Richards' and Brelsford's statements arises.

When Cileshe (A2) seized the kingship, he gave the two titles *MUKUKAMFUMU* and *CANDAMUKULU* to his mother and elder sister and they were inherited according to rule. The *MUKUKAMFUMU*ship dropped from Cileshe's mother to her senior uterine granddaughter, *Kasonde* (B2). When *CANDAMUKULU I* (A1) died, presumably her sister *Kanyanta Bwalya* (A4) was already dead, so the title skipped a generation according to rule and was taken by her senior uterine granddaughter, *Kangwa* (C4). If we return to the *MUKUKAMFUMU*-ship, I think we may safely assume that *Nakasafya* (B5) died before her elder sister *Kasonde* (B2) *MUKUKAMFUMU II* or she would have inherited the title ; and the title could not pass to classificatory sisters in the line of *Kanyanta* (A4) for she had no daughter. The title then did not pass to an own daughter of *MUKUKAMFUMU II* (B2) (say *Cimbabantu*, who later became *CANDAMUKULU IV*, C5, but *query* was she at the time in the hands of the Ngoni by whom she had been captured and not yet released ?). It passed to the daughter of *Nakasafya* (B5) who would have succeeded if she had still been alive, and *Mwendecanda* (C8) became *MUKUKAMFUMU III*. My theoretical reconstruction is difficult because I do not know whether C5 did not succeed because she was held by Ngoni (Brelsford, to a letter, said " yes "), but it seems clear that if *Nakasafya* (B5) had become *MUKUKAMFUMU* the title would then have passed to her own granddaughter through *Mwendecanda* (C8) ; and I assume that if there had been a daughter by Kanyanta (A4) she would have become *MUKUKAMFUMU* and been succeeded by her own granddaughter, and the process by which the *MUKU-KAMFUMU*ship drifts away from the main line would have been accelerated. This drift away of the title is clear in the next generation : when *CANDAMUKULU II* (C4) died, her own sister (C5) succeeded her. Note that on C5's death, the title did not pass to women in the other line (of *Nakasafya*, B5) in that generation (i.e. to C8 or C11), but went to the late holder's daughter, *Cabili* (D7), since the granddaughter was mad. This may mean that if there had been daughters of *Kanyanta* (A4) they would not have got the title *MUKUKAMFUMU* as I suggested above.

When *MUKUKAMFUMU III* (C8) died, the title passed to her own eldest uterine granddaughter, *Nkumbula* (E10), who became *MUKUKAMFUMU IV*, and not the senior classificatory granddaughters, who are presumably E—2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9.

Thus it is clear that the *MUKUKAMFUMU* title (and theoretically

it could have been the *CANDAMUKULU*ship) must sooner or later drift away from the main line, and the holder of it lose the right to bear a king under the rule that succession is to the sons of the senior woman. Thus when Brelsford says (and presumably was told) that the *CANDAMUKULU* and *MUKUKAMFUMU* bear kings, this was true in the earlier generations, but ceases to be true in the later ones; and when Richards says that the mother of the Paramount is always the *CANDAMUKULU* this is not true of the earlier generations, but becomes increasingly true later: for when the sons of *CANDAMUKULU II* and *III* (C4 and 5) have died, since *MUKUKAMFUMU III* (C8) was only the third sister the succession should have dropped to the sons of *CANDAMUKULU IV* (D7). But if according to the rule the mad granddaughter had succeeded, and not the daughter, then even the title *CANDAMUKULU*, though it would still have carried the right to bear a king, would have had that right postponed; for the sons of her mother would have had prior rights to her own children.

What is probable is that the statement that the mother of the king is always *CANDAMUKULU* is stressed by the house that carries that title; while the rights of both titles to bear kings would be stressed by the other house into which the title *MUKUKAMFUMU* has passed.

Clearly, in these rules of succession to the female titles, since they are quite different from the rules of succession to the male titles, lies the source of conflict.

VII

But there is a further drift away from the main line. We have assumed on the evidence of the chart, that when Cileshe (A1) seized the kingship, he expelled the closer relatives of his predecessor from the big territorial chieftainships, and placed there his own close relatives. Despite the passing over for chief's office of his own brother Bwembya (A6) who became *CITIMUKULU II*, all the big titles were held by men who clearly had the right of succession to the kingship. That is, in the general round of promotion which marks any succession, i.e. in the sense that the former second in the line of succession becomes now the first, and the former third now second, people moved steadily nearer to the kingship; and Cikwanda (C6) could even refuse the MWAMBAship and abandon the NKULAship without losing the right to become king. Then Ponde (C10) was accused of refusing the NKOLEMFUMUship and trying to hasten the passing of the MWAMBAship to his line by killing by witchcraft the MWAMBA III (C2), and the MWAMBAship dropped into the fourth generation of the senior house, where there are already so many sons that the junior house is unlikely to attain the MWAMBAship, in that generation or the next. Meantime Ponde (C10) in revenge succeeded in wrenching the NKULAship into his own house,

while he himself refused it, and it is now accepted that the NKULAship runs there, for no one in the senior house opposed B14's claims to succeed B12. But Brelsford says that NKULA V (D14) could still claim the MWAMBAship, and though he would probably have refused it in the old days he might take it today since MWAMBA'S salary is much higher than NKULA's.

Even if NKULA V (D14), the son of a third senior sister, were considered to have a claim to the throne after the sons of the two senior " sisters " of his mother (neglecting the structurally irrelevant fact that the husband of the second sister was an Ngoni), if the succession to NKULAship continued in the junior line, clearly the holder of the NKULAship in the future will, under the rule of succession by the sons of senior sisters, cease to have the right to participate in the general promotion towards the kingship. That is, with the female *MUKUKAMFUMU*ship a major male chieftainship, the NKULAship, with minor chieftainships CIKWANDA, CEWE, and SHIMUMBI, has drifted away from the main line of legal succession to the kingship.

Again, theoretically, I can see no reason why it should not have been the MWAMBAship that drifted away from the main line, while the NKULAship remained; but the important point is that one female chieftainship *had*, under the rules of succession, to drift away, and one major male chieftainship has drifted with it. I cannot say if this was inevitable by the rules of succession, but it seems to me that it was bound to happen as soon as the junior branch, holding a big chieftainship, began to drift out of the line of general promotion to the kingship.

We are now in a position to apply the general theory set out in the introduction to the facts of Bemba succession. I must stress that I do not want to postulate a teleological argument; I am analysing the facts of Bemba history and their effect on the internal organization of the nation.

The first important fact to emphasize is the great temporal power of MWAMBA and NKULA; they are almost equal to CITIMUKULU, the king, though he is ritually superior. Why did these big territorial chiefs not assert their independence of the king and establish independent kingdoms? Because they too were heirs to the kingship in the early stages of the lineage's hold of the kingship and chieftainships. Then NKULA IV (D12), by one legal rule, asserted his claim to the paramountcy, though by another (that the sons of the third sister have no claim), he had lost it. He said that the succession of B5 *Nakasafya's* sons, C6 and C10, had shifted the descent. He lost. His younger brother NKULA V (D14) now asserts his claims above those of Musenga (D6) and Mutale (D10) on the grounds that the latter are half-Ngoni. Could he use the argument that his mother was a *MUKUKAMFUMU* (C8)? Will the sons of *MUKUKAMFUMU IV* (E10) claim the right on this latter ground, though she has 6 senior sisters to bear kings before her in her generation? My only piece of field research was to get Lady

Gore-Browne to ask a Bemba (a supporter of NKULA V, D14) if *MUKUKAMFUMU IV* (E10) had the right to bear kings. He replied, most significantly: "No, she hasn't, but she doesn't know it."

On contradictory legal grounds, each house asserts its claim to the kingship. In the old days this would have led to war; today it leads to a struggle for the Government's support. That is, NKULA V's (D14) family does not assert its independence of the king; it struggles to win the kingship for itself, by asserting a claim, which has some legal foundation, since the rules of succession denote several possible heirs.

Thus Richards says (*African Political Systems*, p. 100):

> In most types of succession whether to the name and spirit of a dead man or to his office, there are usually two or three potential heirs, and although there are certain rules of priority, it is practically never the case that there is one child known as heir to the chieftainship from birth and brought up as such, as occurs in those South African tribes in which the eldest son of the great wife must always succeed. A Bemba chief, or commoner, is succeeded by his brothers in order of age, next by his sister's children, and failing them, by his maternal grandsons. Difficulties arise when there is a choice between an older classificatory "brother", not a sibling, but possibly a mother's sister's son, or an even more distant "brother" still, and a young man, a maternal nephew who is the child of the deceased's own sister, with whom . . . his ties are very close. Here the principles of primogeniture conflict with that of propinquity of kinship, in the case of a branch of a family that has been in existence for three or four generations, and it is probable that in these cases the nearest heir is appointed unless he is manifestly unsuitable, when the more distant "brother" or "maternal nephew" is selected. I never heard of a regent being appointed for a young man as is commonly done in those Bantu tribes where the heir to the throne is known from his time of birth.

We can thus say: in the history of this particular royal lineage at first the big territorial chieftainships were all held by a limited number of close relatives; within the first three generations there was no dispute about who was the rightful heir to the kingship, though there were irregularities in the succession to, and struggles for, the big chieftainships. When it became time for an heir to be taken from the fourth generation (D), there was a dispute between the senior man in two branches, and Government had to settle this matter. This dispute continues, and the junior line is now advancing its claim on different legal grounds from those it used before. Meantime, for some years the two branches have struggled for the minor chieftainships, especially those of chiefs' sons.

The tendency of the Bemba territorial chieftainships to separatism is here canalized in a struggle to make the chief into the king. At the beginning of the rule of a new lineage, the chiefs are close relatives of the king and in the direct legal line of succession to the kingship. Within three or four generations one junior branch, holding a couple of powerful chieftainships, and one chieftainess

title, drifts away from the main line, and loses the legal right of succession, by genealogical position, to the kingship. They then assert that they have the right—on one or other alternative " legal " ground—and are prepared to fight for the throne with their people's support. If the senior branch wins, presumably it would depose the junior branch from all its seats of power ; if the junior branch wins, the senior man in it presumably becomes king and gives his close relatives the big subordinate posts. All the main seats of power are now again held by one small family, and all the sub-chiefs are again in the direct line of succession to the throne. I am prepared to assert that the process now begins again as a repetitive cycle in Bemba history. In terms of the general theory set out above, it seems to me that in this process the territorial sections do not assert their independence of the king and try to establish a second Bemba kingdom, but they struggle to keep or to get the kingship for their head ; that is, the separatist tendency is canalized into a struggle to make the head of the territorial section king. Then in the fight for the kingship, every few generations, a civil war unites the nation and does not divide it, since it returns all the chieftainships into one small family, all of whom have rights to the kingship. It is this process which lies beneath what we see as a dynastic struggle for palace power. Thus we see that here, as Evans-Pritchard said of the Nuer,

> the tendency of tribes and tribal sections towards fission and internal opposition between their parts is balanced by a tendency in the direction of fusion, of the combination or amalgamation of groups . . . Here fission and fusion are two aspects of the same segmentary principle and the Nuer tribe and its divisions are to be understood as a relation between these two contradictory, yet complementary, tendencies . . . the tendency towards political cleavage seems to be inherent in political structure itself.

Among the Nuer, the fission and fusion aspects of the process show in the splitting and uniting of groups at various times ; among the highly organized Bemba the fission aspect appears in the contradictory rules of succession and the drifting of the seats of power, while the fusion principle appears in the ritual superiority of the kingship (of CITIMUKULU) and the struggle of the subordinate chiefs to get the kingship.

If my postulated theory is correct, then certain facts would repeat themselves in Bemba history. On the data we have, the struggle came to a head in the fourth generation from the founder of this lineage, Cileshe (A2). If his younger sister, *Kanyanta* (A4), had had daughters it might have occurred a generation earlier. We are told that there are 25–32 kings remembered, and I suggest that investigation would show the following facts :

(1) That the usurper, Cileshe (A2), stood in the same relationship approximately to the deposed Cimbola (A7), as the present NKULA V (D14) stands to the late CITIMUKULU VIII (D1). Note that the

mothers of both the younger usurper (Cileshe) and the would-be usurper (NKULA V) held the title *MUKUKAMFUMU*, while the mothers of the reigning kings (Cimbola and CITIMUKULU VIII) both held the title *CANDAMUKULU*. Further, I suggest that every three–four–five generations back in Bemba history there will be records of similar inter-familial struggles. It is irrelevant that the people of Cimbola, the deposed king, co-operated to let in the usurper, Cileshe, because the new value of ivory seems to have been an extraneous complicating factor.

(2) Further, these inter-familial struggles must have been based on a junior branch holding one powerful chieftainship and a female title, so this process too must have been recurrent.

(3) I suggest that it will be found that when Cileshe seized power he had to depose not only the king, Cimbola, but also relatives of Cimbola holding chieftainships who were more closely related to the king than he ; and that he then made his own relatives into the big chiefs. This too I suggest has recurred throughout Bemba history, that whosoever won the inter-familial struggle concentrated the minor chieftainships in his own family. Once a man has done this, he need not fear his rival ; we see that Cileshe actually brought Cimbola back and created a new ritual chieftainship for him, and apparently changing Cimbola's mother's title from *CANDAMUKULU* to *CANDAMWEYA* was considered sufficient to do away with Cimbola's family claim to the throne. This fact in itself is strong argument for my general theory.

All the above facts are capable of confirmation, and I consider that if they are found to be as I have postulated, it is strong support for the general theory about African political systems which I have quoted above.

However, there is one point on which I am not clear and can say nothing. Theoretically, the *CANDAMUKULU*ship should have dropped from C5 to her granddaughter, *Katongo* (E2). This would have kept the right to bear kings with the title, but postponed it far into the future.

VIII

If this is correct, what happens now ? Government backs either NKOLEMFUMU (D6) or NKULA (D14) : but whichever line it backs, it will probably leave the other branch retaining its own chieftainship so that the old process of re-integration of the royal chiefs does not occur. Then there may persist strain and jealousy, gradually increasing and culminating in a demand for independence by the junior branch. But if I am correct, whomsoever Government supports, it should support him wholeheartedly. That is, if the present NKOLEMFUMU (D6) is made CITIMUKULU, then on the death of NKULA V (D14) the NKULAship should pass to NKOLEMFUMU's line ; and similarly if the NKOLEMFUMU is rejected for the CITIMUKULUship,

Abbreviated tree of the present Bemba royal house showing descent through the female line. Chieftainships of the Paramount line in capitals. Children of males not shown. (*After Brelsford, with points from Richards or from text added in brackets and with question marks by M. Gluckman.*)

Pecked line runs between the two houses of Kasonde (B2) and Nakasafya (B5).



he should also be rejected for the MWAMBAship. These changes should be made consistently till all the seats of power are again closely linked in one family. Of course, the practicability of doing this depends on how widely based is the power of the rejected man in the nation.

However, there are other possibilities. Government rule may so dominate the whole situation that the Bemba royal family is becoming comparatively insignificant, and the tendency to separation may have ceased to operate. At present, it might not appear in modern administration, because NKULA V has a Native Authority and Treasury independent of the CITIMUKULU and MWAMBA. If this is so, it will not matter whom Government backs, for it will be Government organization which binds the Bemba into a nation; and, assuming the present ruling line is supported, NKULA must accept their paramountcy because he, by Government appointment, is a subordinate official with them in Government's system.

However, it is clear that these possibilities, and the people's reactions, have to be examined before a proper decision can be made in full knowledge of all relevant facts. The academic theory, which I have tried to support, has great practical significance.

KEY TO MAP

⇢ slave export route.

→ direction of tribal raids.

1 and 2 route to Kilwa and Zanzibar.

3 route to Ibo and Lindi.

4 route to Benguella and Loanda.



THE END OF THE SLAVE TRADE IN BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA: 1889–1912

by

LEWIS GANN

Introductory Note

THE material for this paper was collected whilst I was employed as Research Officer by the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute of Northern Rhodesia. I am much indebted to Dr. E. Colson, Professor M. Gluckman of Manchester University and to Dr. J. C. Mitchell of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute for their help. I am also grateful for the suggestions received from Dr. W. Henderson and Mr. E. Robson of Manchester University and Dr. R. Oliver of London University. Mr. V. Hiller, the Chief Archivist of Rhodesia, gave me invaluable help during the course of my stay in Rhodesia.

I have used the following abbreviations in the text.

African S. .	African Correspondence of the Colonial Office, printed for the use of the Colonial Office, copies in the Central African Archives, Salisbury.
anx. . . .	annexure.
BSAC . .	British South Africa Company.
BSAC Mins.	Minutes and annexures of the British South Africa Company, copies in the Central African Archives, Salisbury.
C. . . .	Command Paper, published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
C.O. . .	Colonial Office.
F.O. . .	Foreign Office.
F.O. 84 . .	Slave Trade Correspondence of the Foreign Office, Public Record Office, London, microfilmed copies in Salisbury.
F.O. 2 . .	General Correspondence of the Foreign Office—as above.
F.O. Print .	Printed documents for the use of the Foreign Office, copies in Salisbury.

I have referred throughout the text to the Congo, North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Angola, referring to their present political frontiers, though these were of course not in existence before the arrival of the Europeans.

* * * * * * *

Africa's first major export trade was the traffic in slaves. The earliest to engage in that commerce on a large scale were the

maritime races of Western Europe. From the fifteenth century onwards, the Portuguese began shipping slaves from Africa into the mother country. The discovery of America and the rise of plantation economies in the New World gave an enormous impetus to the trade. Spaniards, Englishmen, French and Dutchmen all joined in the new commerce which was both profitable in itself, and which also gave rise to numerous industries to supply the goods needed in barter from the African sellers. The victims of the trade became the labourers who grew the sugar, the coffee, the tobacco and the cotton, sold to the Old World.[1] Amongst these slaves there were also tribesmen from Central Africa. An American traveller to Brazil in the first half of the nineteenth century, for instance, found amongst the slaves of the country " Angoyans " and also " Mundjola ", described as " fierce and intractable men from the interior ", as well as Makuans from the east and " Takwari " who " lived four days up the river Zambezi ".[2] From the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the " Christian " slave trade began to decline. It was opposed to the growing humanitarian sentiment and the spirit of evangelical Christianity. In addition there were also economic reasons. The slave trade was highly speculative in nature. Besides, the countries of North-Western Europe became more industrialized, and shippers devoted their attention to the export of manufactured goods. The advantages of legitimate trade with the west coast, such as the trade in palm oil, became clearer, and Christian sentiment encouraged pacific trade instead of the traffic in human beings. Britain made an honourable start amongst the Great Powers by abolishing the trade in 1807. She was also the first in the New World to end the institution of slavery, in her West Indian possessions in 1833. The United States followed suit after the victory of the North over the slave-owning Southern states in the American Civil War. Cuba forbade the institution in 1880, and eight years later Brazil also forbade it. The plantation economies, based on monoculture and slavery, disappeared and the great migration of Africans to the Americas came to an end.

1. The Central African Traders

(*a*) *The Arabs.*—The Europeans, however, were not the only ones to engage in the traffic. Whilst the Europeans had mainly, though not entirely, devoted their attention to the west coast, the Arabs extended their trade along the east coast of Africa. Arabs had settled along the east coast since an early age, and according to Arab tradition, the settlements of Mombasa, Pemba and Kilwa

[1] T. Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen, The Negro in the Americas*, A. Knopf, New York (1947), pp. 14–40.

[2] C. Wilkes, *Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition during the Years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1843*, U.S.N., Ingram, Cooke & Co., London (1852), pp. 23–6.

had already been established in the course of the tenth century.[1] In the sixteenth century the Portuguese seized supremacy in the Indian Ocean and along the East African coast after their discovery of the sea route to India. The Portuguese, however, were unable to maintain their hold permanently upon the vast empire which they acquired during their heroic age. By the eighteenth century they had become greatly weakened by the blows which Englishmen and Dutchmen struck against them. The Arab state of Oman in South Arabia benefited from this weakness. It managed to establish a vague suzerainty over the East African coast down to the Rovuma river. By the middle of the following century the Arab possessions along the east coast had become independent of Oman, and Zanzibar the centre of a Muslim dominion.

This Arab state was founded upon slavery. Slaves laboured in the great clove plantations on Zanzibar and Pemba islands, which Sultan Seyid Said helped to bring into existence in the first half of the nineteenth century. Slaves were shipped to the markets of Southern Arabia and Persia as domestic retainers and concubines. Slaves carried ivory from the mainland to the trading posts of the coast, supplying in their persons both the cheapest means of transport available to a non-industrial society, and a most valuable merchandise.[2]

The development of luxury industries in Europe in the nineteenth century gave a great impetus to the ivory trade. Ivory was used in the manufacture of fans, of *objets d'art*, of billiard balls and piano keys, and with the growing wealth of Western Europe the demand for these goods constantly expanded. At first the Arabs exhausted the resources along the coast. As elephants became scarce, they pushed farther inland, cutting out some of the intermediate traders. The vigorous Sultan Seyid Said encouraged this policy of inland expansion. In 1863 Livingstone found the Arabs well established on the west coast of Lake Nyasa.[3] From there they followed the Bisa traders into the interior and penetrated into the Luangwa valley.[4] In addition they added another route across the Nyasa-Tanganyika Plateau directly to Zanzibar.[5] In the early 'nineties, Sharpe, one of the emissaries of the British South Africa Company, found them well established in Lake Mweru country.[6]

The main object of these Arabs and Arab half-castes was trade. In most cases they did not come as permanent settlers, the object

[1] R. Coupland, *East Africa and Its Invaders from the Earliest Times to the Death of Seyyid Said in 1856*, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1938), pp. 15–40.
[2] R. Coupland, *The Exploitation of E. Africa, the Slave Trade and the Scramble*, Faber & Faber, London (1939), pp. 1–5.
[3] D. Livingstone, *Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambezi and its Tributaries and of the Discovery of Lakes Shirwa and Nyasa 1858–64*, Murray, London (1865), pp. 512–13.
[4] H. H. Johnston, *British Central Africa*, Methuen, London (1897), p. 62.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 71–2.
[6] Johnston, F.O. 2nd Jan. 93, No. 3, encl. Report Sharpe (F.O. 2/54).

of the more successful ones being to amass a sufficient fortune to retire to the plantations and the harems of the coast.[1] Trade was their primary interest, and originally they did not show political ambitions. In the course of time, however, the Arabs turned to setting up political dominion, when they had to defend their trade against the European colonial powers, especially the Germans who entered East Africa from 1884 onwards. In addition, they may have found that political power paid in the commercial sense. In the far interior the Sultan's writ did not run. Neither was there any strong indigenous authority amongst the weak disunited tribes extending from Lake Nyasa to Lake Tanganyika and down the Luangwa valley. So the Arab's task was an easy one. He possessed firearms, even breech-loaders, and he knew how to fortify himself in galleried stockades, placed across the centres of communications, and capable of resisting even European artillery. In addition to their military superiority over the Africans, the Arabs were also more advanced in other ways. Giraud, a French explorer who visited the Bemba in the 'eighties, described one of the east coast caravans which he observed. He stated that it contained not only armed retainers, but also smiths and tailors who worked for remuneration for the Africans.[2] In addition the Arabs were valued overlords, for they imported new goods like cloth and guns. So it is not surprising that the Arabs met with little effective resistance. A typical incident in the story of conquest, repeated with variations elsewhere, was the occupation of Marimba on the western shore of Lake Nyasa. First of all a trader came from Zanzibar with a large caravan. He settled at Khota Khota, living at first on friendly terms with the local Nyanja chief. Later, however, friction arose. The Arab then defeated his former host, reducing him to the status of a headman. Then other chiefs came in with their people to settle under the new ruler. The new chief gave offices impartially to local men, to Bemba and Yao retainers, and to Zanzibaris, refusing to give any special advantages to his original followers. He protected his people against other raiders. Like other native chiefs, he raised revenue by collecting grain from local headmen and levying tribute from other caravans, and he insisted on a share in all the ivory shot in his dominions. He also sold rice to other caravans. By these means he managed to make politics pay, as well as acquiring a firm base for his trading operations.[3] Marimba was only a small chieftaincy. Other traders managed to expand their dominion over much vaster areas in their attempts to combine commercial profit with political power. Thus Msidi, a Bantu Nyamwezi trader who had come in from the east, succeeded in establishing a powerful

[1] Johnston, F.O. 2nd March 1894 Report on the First 3 Years of the Administration (F.O. 2/66).

[2] V. Giraud, *Les Lacs de l'Afrique Equatoriale*, Hachette, Paris (1890), pp. 261–2.

[3] Major Edwards to Johnston, 17th July 1894 (F.O. 2/67), *British Central Africa Gazette*, 20/8/94.

state in the Southern Congo. His dominion rested on gunpowder, the trade in ivory and copper, and the export of slaves. It extended over the Luapula, Lualaba and the Zambezi-Congo watershed, where Msidi was able to maintain the monopoly of shooting elephants by the simple means of burning out any offending villages.[1, 2]

(*b*) *The Yao.*—Whilst the Arabs were dominating the northern routes, the Yao were the principal dealers along the southern routes from the interior to the coastal towns of the east. The Yao were a Bantu tribe, who, according to their own tradition, had come from the Lujenda and the Rovuma rivers east of Lake Nyasa.[3] Already during the course of the eighteenth century they were carrying on a flourishing trade with the Arabs of Zanzibar and with the Bisa.[4] Trade was their chief means of acquiring beads, cloth and other luxuries, and, above all, guns. Gradually they drifted into Southern Nyasaland, coming not as a great, unified army, but as small groups of settlers under minor chiefs, slowly subjugating the local Nyanja chiefs who were unable to resist their firearms. There were pressures of various kinds impelling the Yao to move west. There were internal tribal dissensions, there were struggles between different Yao tribes, and finally there was external pressure exerted upon them by the Lomwe tribe.[5] In the case of the Yao, the slave trade therefore became mixed up with the search for new land for settlement. In addition, the Yao, like other Bantu tribes, employed slaves for domestic purposes. The Yao lacked a central state organization. Minor chieftains and headmen competed with one another for power. This they could only obtain by getting followers, and one of the means of obtaining followers was the slave hunt. The captives were incorporated into the headman's retinue. The women became junior wives, whilst the men would engage in farming, building, basket-making and other recognized male occupations.[6] The chief's sons who were not in the matrilineal line of succession would then become the invaluable servants of the chief, and became entrusted with important positions as war leaders and ambassadors, since they could not play for their own hands.[7] The greater chiefs had an additional political incentive for engaging in

[1] F. S. Arnot, *Garenganze or Seven Years' Missionary Work in Central Africa*, J. Hawkins, London, pp. 231–43.

[2] For Arab methods of establishing political rule see also D. Campbell, *In the Heart of Bantuland*, Seeley Service & Co., London (1922), pp. 258–60.

[3] Dr. J. C. Mitchell, *The Yao Village, a Study in Social Structure*. Unpublished thesis for the Degree D.Phil.(Oxon).

[4] R. Burton, *The Lands of the Cazembe, Lacerda's Journey to Cazembe in 1789*, translated and annotated by Sir R. Burton, J. Murray, London (1873), pp. 37, 57.

[5] Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–40.

[6] Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 58, quoting D. Macdonald, *Africana or the Heart of Heathen Africa*, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London (1882), 2 vols., Vol. 1, pp. 147–8, 155–6.

[7] Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

the trade. Trade would bring them gunpowder, and the possession of gunpowder in turn gave them some kind of control over their turbulent minor vassals.[1]

When Livingstone visited Nyasaland in 1866, he found the Yao well established in the south of the country.[2] Thirty years later a Yao lieutenant had settled well towards the east in the Chewa country, where he had taken up residence with chief Mwase Kasungu. Here the Yao built a strong stockade. He acquired great influence with the local Africans, and traded all the way down to the Zambezi with the Portuguese.[3]

(*c*) *Portuguese Half-Castes and Tribes under Portuguese Influence.*—Portuguese half-castes formed the third group of raiders taking part in the inland slave trade. Some came from the Eastern Zambezi valley and preyed upon the people along the Luangwa. In Livingstone's days the " Mambari " were already conducting their traffic along the Zambezi,[4] and in the early 'nineties, A. Sharpe found the Southern Luangwa valley largely depopulated by Portuguese half-castes who employed hunters who were called Chikunda.[5] Their operations extended as far north as Kazembe's country. These southern invaders never attempted to set up permanent political authority along the Luangwa, though they did create temporary bases of operations. The Zambezi valley was their home. It was here that their great estates, called *prazos*, were situated. Their living depended in the main on the ownership of these estates, rather than on trade. Catching slaves was a convenient way of increasing the number of retainers on their fiefs. It was not vital to their livelihood, and the Luangwa valley did not form an integral part of their dominions. Johnston, the first British Commissioner of British Central Africa, has given us a description of Matakenya, the most powerful of them all. Matakenya was a half-caste of considerable education. He owned land, houses and ivory stores from Zumbo to Tete, and he was supposed to be able to lead twelve thousand armed slaves into the field. Yet he was by no means unfriendly to the British. In 1893 Johnston reported that Matakenya would only raid the Luangwa valley until the British had established their authority there.[6] Matakenya was indeed true to his word. The eastern Portuguese never constituted a serious problem, once British occupation became effective, and they mostly left before the arrival of the new conquerors.

Other traders came from the west. Some again were Portuguese

[1] Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

[2] H. Waller, *The Last Journals of D. Livingstone*, J. Murray, London (1874), p. 109.

[3] Johnston, F.O. 24th July 1896, and encl. No. 9 (F.O. 2/106), *British Central Africa Gazette*, 15th Feb. 1896.

[4] D. Livingstone, *The Zambezi and its Tributaries*, pp. 240–1.

[5] Johnston, F.O. 30th Sept. 1890, encl. Report Sharpe Johnston No. 31 (F.O. 2/52).

[6] Johnston, letter Anderson, 23rd March 1893 (F.O. 2/54).

half-castes. Others belonged to tribes from the province of Angola, mainly to the Mbundu people. The Portuguese had always been great traders. They mixed freely with the Africans during the long periods of time when they extended their operations outside the area directly governed by the Portuguese government. They often became the vassals of native chiefs and possessed a considerable influence in some native tribes. One of these was the Mbundu. Already by the end of the eighteenth century they had become great slave traders. They greatly increased their trade when ivory ceased to be a royal monopoly in Angola in 1834. Like the Arabs, they pushed farther and farther inland to acquire ivory. In the 'seventies ivory was replaced by wild rubber as an article of trade, and a new incentive was added to further inland penetration. The Mbundu rubber-dealers, with their commercial training, also became the most important slave traders, as slave porters were essential to their commerce.[1] Slaves in turn became a valuable article for export. The cocoa plantations of St. Thomas offered an inexhaustible market, as Western Europe bought more and more cocoa.[2] In catching slaves for export overseas, the Angolan dealers resembled their Muslim colleagues who sent their merchandise to the clove plantations of Zanzibar. Unlike their Arab colleagues, however, they never established political rule of their own. They preferred to work through native chiefs. They made their payment in guns and gunpowder. These traders in turn built up the power of chiefs like Kakenge of the Lovale or Msidi in the Congo [3] and enabled them to raid for more slaves. In the course of all this raiding, however, the victims too acquired guns and hit on the idea of selling their captives. So both the trade and the firearms spread inland like an epidemic, devastating the countryside.

The " Mambari " differed from the Muslims in other ways. The Arabs whom Giraud had observed in the east, like native chiefs, attracted their followers by promise of food.[4] The " Mambari " servants, on the other hand, were themselves budding slave traders, who invested their gains in new ventures, and who finally became merchants on their own account.[5] The range of their penetration was, however, equally wide. In 1878 Biheno merchants were reported to be at the mouth of the river Kafue in Northern Rhodesia,[6] and Giraud in the 'eighties found them as far west as

[1] G. M. Childs, *Umbundu Kinship and Character*, Oxford University Press (1949), pp. 191–8.

[2] Consul Nightingale to F.O. 20th Jan. 1902, No. 287 (African S. 702); printed documents for the use of the Colonial Office, copies in C.A.A.

[3] F. S. Arnot, *Missionary Travels in Central Africa*, Seeley Service & Co., London (1914), pp. 84–94. Coillard, *op. cit.* (pp. 607-10). D. Livingstone, *Missionary Travels and Researches in Africa*, J. Murray, London (1857), p. 181.

[4] Giraud, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

[5] D. Campbell, *Blazing Trails in Bantuland*, pp. 28–9.

[6] Major Serpa Pinto, tr. by A. Elwes, *How I crossed Africa*, Sampson, Lowe, Marston, Searle & Rivington, London (1881), 2 vols., II, p. 115.

the Ushi country, west of Lake Bangweulu in North-Eastern Rhodesia.[1]

2. The Attitude of the Locally Dominant Tribes

The slave trade described above did not act upon a passive population. There were very considerable differences between the organization of the Central African tribes, and these influenced their reactions to the traffic. Some of them took an active part in the trade. In North-Eastern Rhodesia the most powerful of the local participants were the Bemba. They had probably come from the Congo basin originally where they had formed part of the powerful Luba empire.[2] In Northern Rhodesia they set up a powerful military state under a chief who styled himself Chitimukulu, probably some time in the first half of the eighteenth century. With their centralized, military organization they managed to defeat all opponents, including the powerful Ngoni from the east. They themselves produced little. They possessed no cattle and their country was infertile. Consequently they were unable to engage in trade with their neighbours, the Tabwa salt-makers, the Fipa iron-makers or the cotton-growing people of Lake Rukwa, or the Lungu cattle-breeders.[3] Instead of conducting trade, they raided them, relying on their organization and weight of numbers. They killed all men, and Wissman, a German soldier and explorer, stated that the status of a Bemba warrior depended on the number of heads he had taken.[4] Some of the slaves taken were kept in domestic servitude and lived with their masters like poor relatives. The Bemba country, however, was probably too poor to make it possible for the Bemba to gather very large numbers of followers from abroad. So the chiefs sold many of their prisoners to Arab slave dealers.[5, 6] In exchange the Arabs supplied them with guns, and Cpt. Wheaterley who visited the Bemba in 1898 found them heavily armed with "Tower" muskets which the British Army discarded after the Crimean War.[7]

Another slave-raiding chief was Kazembe, the Paramount of the Eastern Lunda on the Luapula river in North-Eastern Rhodesia. According to a report by Fr. João Pinto who visited the chief in 1798 together with Dr. Lacerda, Kazembe and his people had come

[1] Giraud, *op. cit.*, p. 520.

[2] H. Pineau, *Eveque Roi de Brigands, Monseigneur Dupont de Pères Blancs, Premier Vicaire Apostolique du Nyasa*, Quebec, Montreal, 3rd edition (1949), pp. 73–82, using unpublished notes by Fr. R. P. Labreque on the history of the Bemba. I. Cunnison (unpublished data) relates them to the Lunda.

[3] L. A. Wallace, *Geographical Journal*, June 1899, Vol. XIII, p. 601.

[4] H. Von Wissman, *Meine Zweite Durchquerung Aequatorial-Afrikas vom Kongo zum Zambezi Wahrend der Jahre 1886 und 1887*, Globusverlag, Berlin (1890), pp. 273–4.

[5] Wissman, *op. cit. loc. cit.*

[6] Giraud, *op. cit.*, pp. 254–61.

[7] Cpt. Wheaterley, *British Central African Gazette*, 15th Feb. 1898.

from the west some time in the first half of the eighteenth century.[1] In the eighteenth century already Kazembe was dealing in slaves, exchanging his captives with the Bisa for oxen.[2] Kazembe also traded with Angola through the powerful Congo kingdom of Muato Yamvo, whom he recognized as his "father".[3] His commercial position rested on the monopoly of ivory which he exchanged for cloth.[4] This wealth made it possible for him to make generous gifts to his vassals.[5] In the Lunda country, as in all the other kingdoms associated in the trade, the trade in ivory was the most important source of new goods, and took an important part in strengthening the power of the chief. As everywhere else, however, the trade in ivory was associated with the trade in slaves. So it is hardly surprising that when Arab traders penetrated to Kazembe's country in the nineteenth century, they found a ready partner in the traffic. In turn Kazembe received powder and guns from them[6] and thus found his position further strengthened. Kazembe was well placed for raiding. He commanded the resources of the Luapula valley, rich in fish and cassava, and so he was able to maintain a large population concentrated in a small area. Sharpe for instance thought that his stockade contained as many as twenty thousand people. This must have made it easy for the chief to send out expeditions at short notice in great strength. Besides, rigid discipline could be maintained over the people, and observers were struck by the harshly authoritarian rule which the Kazembes maintained.[7] Kazembe also attracted a number of followers from the outside, men who fled from the depredations of the trade elsewhere. On the other hand it does not seem that Kazembe raided to increase the population in his valley. In this he seems to have differed from the rulers of the Lozi river kingdom, in the fertile Central Zambezi valley. The Lozi were always anxious to increase their population. However, they possessed a far more highly differentiated economy than the Lunda. They possessed cattle, the Eastern Lunda possessed none. They attempted to settle people possessing different skills, who would take part in an interchange of products. The Lunda, with their less-differentiated economy, were less well placed for such a policy. Whatever the reasons were, Kazembe took a very active part in the sale of captives. He therefore remained opposed to effective European domination. In 1890 he did indeed sign a treaty with Sharpe, the representative of H.M. Commissioner for British Central Africa, and one of the men in whom the British South Africa Company placed their confidence.[8] At that time, however, the British

[1] Burton, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
[2] Burton, *op. cit.*, p. 231, report by F. J. Baptista.
[3] Burton, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–1.
[4] Burton, *op. cit.*, pp. 41, 44.
[5] Burton, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
[6] A. Sharpe to Sir C. Hill (Letter), 17th Sept. 1899 (F.O. 2/210).
[7] Giraud, *op. cit.*, p. 381.
[8] Johnston, F.O. 1st Feb. 1890 and enclosures, No. 6 (F.O. 84/2051).

had no real means of making their power felt in the distant north, and the treaty could have meant little to the chief. Later, Kazembe steadily refused to submit to the authority of the British South Africa Company, or to abstain from raiding.[1] Had he done so, he would have struck a heavy blow against the bases of his own power.

In the west the slave trade was encouraged by the Portuguese. Already in the eighteenth century they had been interested in the manpower resources of the interior of Angola.[2] They were in need of more and more slaves to build up the plantation economy of Brazil. By that time, however, the tribes immediately inland were already well armed.[3] Thus further penetration in turn became necessary, and the trade in guns and powder extended ever farther into the interior. By the second half of the nineteenth century the Lovale people in the extreme west of Northern Rhodesia were beginning to acquire guns. At that time the powerful Lunda empire of Muato Yamvo in the Congo was disintegrating. The Lunda empire had shown signs of decline from the eighteenth century onwards, and outlying chiefs became autonomous. Muato Yamvo ceased to be able to control them effectively and retained only a shadowy ritual power. So the Lunda settlers along the northern edge of North-Western Rhodesia themselves became victims of attacks by other tribes. One of these was the Lovale to their west, who were geographically better placed for the trade in guns. They harried their Lunda neighbours, and sold their captives to Portuguese slave raiders.[4] The Lovale were great hunters, and this training stood them in good stead in their operations. In turn the Lunda too acquired guns. In 1897 the Western Lunda had still been reported to be without guns,[5] but by the time the officials of the British South Africa Company began to enter their country (19?), they were well supplied. Guns were used in internecine warfare. They also took their part in changing the technique of hunting, which played an important part in Lunda economy. Lastly they contributed to the remarkable spirit of independence which the Lunda showed against the first British officials who attempted to bring their country under effective administration.

[1] R. Codrington to Chief Secretary at Bulawayo 19th Sept. 1899 (BSAC Mins. 13th Dec. 1899 anx. 13).

[2] Burton, *op. cit.* Dr. Laçerda to R. de Sousa, Coutinho, Minister of State, pp. 14–29.

[3] *Op. cit. loc. cit.*

[4] Major Gibbons to Director of Military Intelligence 8th Jan. 1900 (BSAC Mins. 7th March 1900, anx. 72). (Minutes of British South Africa Company and annexures, cyclostyled copies in Central African Archives, Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia.) Colonel Harding, BSAC 4th April 1900, No. 145, encl. (African S. 656). I am also greatly indebted to Mr. V. Turner, an anthropologist of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, for allowing me access to an unpublished paper on Lunda history.

[5] Major Goold Adams, F.O. 24th Aug. 1897, No. 150 (African S. 552).

Not all the tribes, however, engaged in the slave trade. Some raided people for entirely different purposes. The Ngoni people belonged to that group. They were largely of South African descent, having been driven out by the powerful Zulu despot Shaka about 1821.[1] Their main body crossed the Zambezi in 1835 and later split into various sections, some settling in the Fort Jameson district of North-Eastern Rhodesia under their chief Mpeseni, others finding a permanent home in Nyasaland.[2] The Ngoni possessed vast herds of cattle, unlike most of the tribes of North-Eastern Rhodesia. The Ngoni cattle could move with the advancing host and supplied a kind of "four-legged commissariat" which made the army independent of what it could cultivate or loot on the way, giving it a much vaster range of action than was possessed by a purely agricultural tribe. The Ngoni cattle also supplied them with their heavy ox-hide shields which were impenetrable to native arms. In battle the Ngoni employed the Zulu tactics of the spear crescent. Instead of merely hurling their spears and withdrawing, they charged with stabbing spears in half-moon fashion, outflanking and crushing their enemy. These tactics were the worst imaginable against well-trained troops using breech-loaders and machine guns.[3] They possessed, however, a deadly effectiveness against other Africans and in Northern Rhodesia only the Bemba were able to withstand them,[4] whilst all other tribes became helpless victims of their attacks. The European members of the Administration from afar did indeed tend to explain their raids as raids for slaves.[5] Dr. Barnes, who has studied the Mpeseni Ngoni, has come to a different conclusion. The real object of the Fort Jameson Ngoni was to increase the manpower of the tribe. The captives were distributed by the king and by his senior lieutenants to important men who could thus rise in their political status, whilst the captives became assimilated into the tribe. The political system of the tribe was based upon this external recruitment and the Ngoni lived a parasitic existence upon their neighbours.[6] The Ngoni gradually expanded from the densely settled Fort Jameson district into the ring of no man's land surrounding them, and as their population

[1] E. H. Lane Poole, *Native Tribes of the Eastern Province of Northern Rhodesia*, Government Printer, Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia (1938), pp. 4–5. Rev. A. Elmslie, *Among the Wild Angoni*, Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, London and Edinburgh (1899), p. 19.

[2] Lane Poole, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–10.

[3] Cpt. Brake Report to Acting Commissioner Manning, 21st Jan. 1898, encl. in Manning to F.O. 17th Feb. 1898, No. 73 (F.O. 2/147).

[4] Elmslie, *op. cit.*, pp. 79–91.

[5] Memo. Sir H. Johnston, F.O. 6th Feb. 1897 (F.O. 2/127).

[6] Dr. J. Barnes, unpublished thesis, *Politics in a Changing Society*: D.Phil. (Oxon) in the keeping of the Dept. of Anthropology, Manchester, quoting Livingstone, *Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambesi and its Tributaries*, J. Murray, London (1865), p. 385; C. Wiese, "Beitrage zur Geschichte der Zulu im Norden des Zambezi, namentlich der Angoni", *Zeitschrift fur Ethnologie*, XXXII (1900), pp. 181–201.

increased by constant assimilation it is probable that even without the British conquest they would have found it difficult to carry on their predatory policy permanently. However, this policy prevented them from trading with the Arabs. They needed their captives, and with their almost perfect system of military tactics for native warfare they felt no need to acquire new kinds of weapons. In this they resembled their Ndebele kinsmen south of the Zambezi who similarly recruited their strength from foreign captives [1] and similarly did not engage in the slave trade, preferring to fight their battles on the whole with ox-hide shield and spear rather than with the musket. The depredations of the Ngoni were very serious.[2] However, the Ngoni in Northern Rhodesia and in Nyasaland were less of a danger to the British than the gun-owning Yao of Nyasaland. In South Nyasaland the Ngoni spear crescents even constituted a barrier to Yao encroachments. Major Edwards, the Commandant of the British Nyasaland forces, held that the Ngoni should be supported against the Yao.[3] Altogether the Ngoni were thus far from being regarded as the main opponents of the Administration, either in Nyasaland or, at first, in North-Eastern Rhodesia.

The most powerful and civilized indigenous state in Northern Rhodesia, however, was Barotseland. The Barotse or Lozi kingdom was a Bantu state, based on the Upper Zambezi. In the fertile flood plain of the river agriculture could be carried on easily. There was fish and waterfowl. Lastly, the Barotse possessed great herds of cattle. On these economic foundations the Lozi were able to build up a very complex state organization.[4] They dominated a great part of North-Western Rhodesia and a portion of present-day Portuguese Angola and the Caprivi Strip, but their rule was not simply a bloody despotism. Force indeed played some part in the maintenance of the Lozi dominion. A more important factor, however, was the strength of their well-integrated economy and their political cohesion. The Lozi were able to loan cattle from the valley to the tribes which they subjugated, and whilst they extorted tribute from their subjects, they gave them presents and protection from their foreign enemies.[5] The Lozi kingdom was held together by a system of exchange, based on tribute in which each tribe participated with some specialized product.[6] This complex economy needed men with different skills to keep it going.

[1] M. Hole, *The Making of Rhodesia*, Macmillan & Co., London (1926), pp. 44–5.

[2] A. Sharpe, F.O. 24th Dec. 1896, No. 143 (F.O. 2/108).

[3] Notes by Major Edwards supplied by H.M. Acting Commissioner, *British Central Africa Gazette*, 14th Dec. 1894.

[4] M. Gluckman, *The Economy of the Central Barotse Plain*, Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Paper No. 7 (1941), Livingstone. *Essays on Lozi Land and Royal Property*, Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Paper No. 10 (1943), Livingstone.

[5] Coryndon, BSAC 28th Feb. 1901 (African S. 659, 9649, No. 89).

[6] Hole, *op. cit.*, p. 211, footnote 1.

The Barotse valley besides was not densely populated. So the Lozi made no attempts to export their labour and instead tried to attract more, either by devastating raids on their neighbours or by enforcing tribute of children, or by encouraging voluntary immigration and assimilating the newcomers into the tribe.[1, 2] In any case the Lozi possessed the means for legitimate trade. The king possessed a monopoly of ivory and rubber.[3, 4] He traded his wealth with the Portuguese, with Griqua traders [5] and with the English who first arrived from the south in 1871.[6] The English traders introduced the English percussion musket instead of the Belgian-made flint-locks, with which the Portuguese were trading,[7] and displaced their competitors. They hardly ever dealt in slaves, however. Apart from moral scruples, they had no incentive to do so, for they used ox wagons which could penetrate into Barotseland without having to cross tsetse-fly country.[8] In South Africa there was no market for slaves, for from 1833 onwards slavery had been forbidden in the British Empire. The diamond fields of Kimberley employed free wage labourers. The Boer farmers, with their ever-expanding pastoral economy, might require a few " apprentices ", but they had no need of large numbers of imported slaves. Instead the British merchants exported ivory, beeswax, curios and other articles. The Lozi themselves gave no encouragement to Portuguese half-caste slave traders. Despite occasional lapses, there was always opposition to the Mambari slavers,[9] and as soon as King Lewanika had re-established royal power after a long civil war, he once more enforced the old policy in 1890.[10] The slave trade was therefore canalized along the northern edge of North-Western Rhodesia through Lunda and Lovale country, and a large portion of the Territory remained free from its ravages.

3. The Significance of the Slave Trade

A few areas in Central Africa managed to remain free from the scourge of the traffic in human beings. The great majority, however, did not. It did not matter where the raiders came from, the

[1] Coillard, *op. cit.*, pp. 471–2.
[2] Major Goold Adams, F.O. 10th Oct. 1897, No. 169 (African S. No. 552).
[3] Dr. E. Holub, *Sieben Jahre in Sudafrika, 1872–9*, A. Holder, Vienna (1890), Vol. II, p. 187.
[4] L. Cordeiro, *Silva Porto*, Sociedade de Geographia, Lisboa (1890), p. 6.
[5] D. Livingstone, *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa*, J. Murray, London (1897), p. 207.
[6] F. Selous, *A Hunter's Wanderings in Africa*, Macmillan & Co., London (1907), p. 256.
[7] Serpa Pinto, *op. cit.*, pp. 221–2.
[8] Dr. E. Holub, *Eine Culturskizze des Marutse Mambunda Reiches*, K.u.k. Geographische Gesellschaft, Vienna (1879), pp. 168–70.
[9] D. Livingstone, *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa*, J. Murray, London (1857), pp. 213, 216.
[10] Coillard, *op. cit.*, pp. 382, 401

results of their attacks were always the same. Everywhere there was the same story of burnt villages, of slaughter and the devastation of crops. The loss of life caused by these raids must have been enormous, though it is of course impossible to give any exact figures. Burton, a British explorer, estimated that in order to capture fifty-five women, the merchandise of one of the caravans he observed, at least ten villages had been destroyed, each having a population of between one and two hundred souls. The greater part of these were exterminated or died of starvation.[1] In addition to these losses, there was the loss of life incurred on the road to captivity. This again horrified all observers.[2] The trade must have constituted a severe drain on the manpower resources of Central Africa. It revolted all the moral feelings of Europe. The trade in slaves also constituted a barrier to any political penetration which a European power might undertake.

The slave traders themselves maintained a rival system of political power. Either they established dominions of their own, or else they distributed guns to the indigenous population, so much so that Portuguese-imported guns were even said to be finding their way into Southern Rhodesia.[3] As a British police officer put it, these guns in native hands led to "an attitude of intolerable independence".[4] It is probable that had the traffic been continued over long periods, it might have seriously affected the balance of power as between Europeans and Africans in certain regions.

Also, in Livingstone's words, the slave trade would prove "an insurmountable barrier to all moral and commercial progress"[5] in Central Africa. Commerce could not flourish, as long as potential customers of manufactured goods from Europe were murdered or abducted by men without manufactured goods of their own to sell and thus less interested in building up an internal market. Nor as long as the traffic continued could the African continent become a producer of tropical products.[6]

Again, no European settlement could take place for the direct exploitation of the resources of the country. The Yao slave raiders, for instance, interfered with the labourers on the European coffee estates on Mount Mlanje.[7] In North-Western Rhodesia George

[1] Commander V. L. Cameron, *Across Africa*, 2 vols., Dalty, Isbister & Co., London (1877), Vol. II, pp. 137–8.

[2] H. H. Johnston, *British Central Africa*, Methuen, London (1897), pp. 158–9. D. Campbell, *Blazing Trails in Bantuland*, p. 29.

[3] For distribution of firearms see Harding, BSAC 22nd Dec. 1899 (BSAC Minutes, 25th April 1900, anx. 5); Major St. Gibbons, Director, Military Intelligence, 8th June 1899, No. 157; Harding, BSAC 24th July 1900 (BSAC Mins. 21st Nov. 1900, anx. 4), *British Central Africa Gazette*, 5th Feb. 1898, Cpt. Wheaterley.

[4] Harding, BSAC 24th July 1900 (BSAC Mins. 21st Nov. 1900, anx. 4).

[5] D. Livingstone, *Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambezi and its Tributaries*, p. 595.

[6] Burton, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 322.

[7] Johnston, F.O. 24th Nov. 1891 and 29th Dec. 1891, and encl. Planters Bradshaw and Bowhill to Johnston, 24th Nov. 1891, No. 19 (F.O. 84/2114).

Grey, the representative of a great British mining and concession company, complained bitterly to his London office that as long as the Mambari were allowed to carry on their traffic, his work at Kansanshi mine would remain very difficult. His company was not slow to communicate these views to the governing British South Africa Company, to which it was financially allied.[1] The slave trade was thus not only immoral and cruel. As the Commandant of the British South Africa Company's police in North-Western Rhodesia put it succinctly, it also constituted " iniquitous abduction of valuable labour ".[2]

A system of slave labour could not exist side by side with a system of wage labour. The European mining managers and railway engineers needed African labour. However, they did not want to " own " Africans and keep them till their dying days. They did not want women. They wanted adult African labourers for limited periods, working for wages and bound to them by contract. They did not want to mobilize their labour through forcible abduction. They were willing and able to recruit labour and to return it to the villages. They were prepared to pay wages. Wages, combined with the indirect inducement of taxation, the lure of new trade goods and the facilities of efficient recruiting organizations, would produce the required hands. The Arab plantation owners or petty chiefs did not have those means at their disposal. Even had they wanted to, they could not have organized a continuous system of wage-labour migration. So they resorted to the man-hunt and employed slaves.

The slave trade also stood for a different attitude towards the Africans in a wider sense. The black slave suffered terribly on the march from the kraal to the coast. Once he had arrived at his destination, however, he usually led a fairly easy life. The Arab or half-caste plantation owner did not stand over him with his watch in his hands, checking results. The Muslim had no watch. He had no production schedule. The European was different. H. Johnston, the first British Commissioner for Central Africa, a very acute observer, was even convinced that it was preferable for the slave to remain with his old owner rather than be liberated and be put in charge of a Christian mission. The Arab's " tolerable form of servitude " was more agreeable than " the tutelage of a Christian mission, with its regular hours of work, its plain diet, severe chastity and absence of exhilarating orgies ", as far as the slave was concerned.[3]

Again the two civilizations differed in their attitude towards

[1] R. Williams, BSAC 5th Feb. 1902 and encl. R. Grey, R. Williams, 15th Oct. 1901 (North-Eastern Rhodesia Public Records, London Office, 1/2/3/4, cyclostyled copies C.A.A.).

[2] Col. Harding Report, 4th May 1901 (BSAC Mins. 8th May 1901, anx. 1).

[3] Johnston, F.O. 18th July 1891 (F.O. Print 6178/1891, printed documents for the use of the Foreign Office, C.A.A.).

assimilating the African. In most cases the European believed in the segregation of the African labourer. The Arab, on the other hand, believed in assimilation. He took Negro wives. He practised polygamy like the African. Besides, Muslim slavery was not a rigidly fixed status, but one allowing for an infinite number of gradations from misery to wealth. As one observer put it, " That gaily dressed man with riches of cloth for exchange is a slave, and that poor woman who has brought her basket of meal into the market to sell looks upon him in awe and envy with her companion who carries her ware and who is her slave." [1] The slave trade stood indeed for " a rival kind of civilization to that of the white man which it is of a much easier notion for the Negro mind to accept ".[2] One of the two had to go, for between the two " peaceful co-existence " was impossible.

4. The Suppression of the Slave Trade

The leading European protagonist in the struggle was Great Britain. She had already taken an active part in suppressing the slave trade on the west coast of Africa in the first half of the nineteenth century. Later Livingstone's denunciations of the slave trade in Central Africa, his discoveries, and his heroic death in Northern Rhodesia roused missionary enthusiasm for the liberation of Central Africa. Side by side with the religious, there were economic motives. Britain had become the world's leading commercial and industrial power. With the growth of her industries, more and more of her people became capable of buying tropical products. One of these was palm oil which Britain imported from the west coast of Africa, and which replaced the slave trade there. Another was cotton. During the American Civil War both American cotton production and exports suffered a very serious drop, and bitter distress resulted in Lancashire. This produced a demand for new sources of cotton, and Livingstone, amongst many others, was greatly interested in the possibilities of Africa for cotton. In addition, Africa might become a market for cotton cloth and other cheap manufactured goods which British factories were now turning out in great quantities. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the development of steam ships capable of using it, East Africa became very easily accessible [3] and in 1866 already Great Britain was the foremost White trading power in Zanzibar.[4]

[1] E. C. Hore, *Tanganyika, 11 Years in Central Africa*, Stanford, London (1892), p. 73.

[2] Johnston Report to F.O. on the First 3 Years of the Administration of British Central Africa, 3rd March 1894 (F.O. 2/66).

[3] Based on L. C. A. Knowles, *The Economic Development of the British Empire 1763–1914*, Studies in Economic and Political Science, Routledge, London.

[4] R. Coupland, *The Exploitation of East Africa*, Faber & Faber, London (1939), p. 78.

There could, however, be no further expansion of trade if the slave trade with its ravages was to go on, and British policy was always bitterly hostile to the traffic.

Missionary, commercial free-trading, and humanitarian considerations thus all combined into a single, consistent and intelligent policy. There could be no evangelization without security of life and property. This security depended on the destruction of the slave trade. This in turn could, however, only be achieved if the traffic in slaves was replaced by some other form of trade in tropical produce. These would supply British factories with their raw materials. They would also create a market for their goods. Improved trade, provided it was not hampered by vexatious tariffs, would help the poor in Lancashire. It would also civilize the African tribesman, giving him new wants and new aspirations. These could be met by hard work and sober living, all of which in their turn would produce an attitude of mind favourable for the reception of the Gospel.

At first Britain used her strong position to check the trade by indirect means. British diplomatic representations to France and to Portugal helped to end the export of slaves from Portuguese territory across the Atlantic and to Mauritius. Diplomacy, backed by sea-power, also induced the Sultan of Zanzibar to forbid the trans-oceanic slave trade in 1873.[1] In return, Britain supported Zanzibar in other ways. Zanzibar, though a Muslim state, was almost a free-trading country and British commercial interests could only benefit from such a policy. Neither warships nor diplomacy could stop the caravans on the mainland, however. Neither could the Sultan do so, for his authority in the interior was of a most shadowy kind.[2] A direct attempt was then undertaken by the "African Lakes Company", a commercial body formed with missionary support, to oust the Arab slave traders from their foothold on the north end of Lake Nyasa. Open war broke out as the Company attempted to give protection to African tribesmen against the Arabs, and as it attempted to break into the Arab ivory monopoly in the region. There was serious fighting, but the Company was too weak to achieve its aims.[3, 4] H. Johnston therefore negotiated peace between the Arabs and the Company in 1888, which left the Arabs where they were. The missionaries who had settled along the shores of Lake Nyasa from the eighteen-sixties onwards were similarly unable to restrain the Yao raiders from their depredations. Effective suppression only became possible once the Foreign Office assumed direct control. This was made possible by a combination of various circumstances. There was the pressure from missionary opinion. There was the failure of "indirect rule"

[1] Coupland, *op. cit.*, pp. 134–6, 182–216. [2] Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
[3] Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 73–6.
[4] J. W. Jack, *Day Break at Livingstonia*, Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, Edinburgh and London (1901), pp. 271–80.

at Zanzibar, when Germany entered the field of colonial expansion in East Africa.[1] There was Portuguese rivalry as Portugal attempted to make her claims to Nyasaland effective. Besides, Rhodes, one of the greatest captains of industry in South Africa and a firm believer in British colonial expansion, offered financial support to the Imperial Government in return for important concessions.[2] In 1891 the whole of Nyasaland became an Imperial Protectorate and the older policy of non-intervention in the interior had been abandoned.

Johnston, the new Commissioner, did not at once start a general crusade. He possessed neither the military nor the financial resources to do so and at first confined himself to dealing with a minor Yao trouble-maker who interfered with British planters on Mount Mlanje and robbed European travellers. Later he extended his operations to the southern shore of the lake, where he forced most of the slavers to submit.[3] The powerful chief Makanjira, however, resisted vigorously and inflicted a serious reverse on the British.[4] But after a series of minor campaigns, decisive action was taken. A well-appointed seaborne expedition, supported by gunboats, overwhelmed Makanjira's town which was strongly fortified and defended by cannon, and the east coast of Nyasa was cleared.[5] In the following year a concerted attack by the chiefs belonging to the Machinga group of Yao in the south was broken up and the stronghold of Mount Chikala was captured.[6] The Mlanje district was finally pacified [7] and by 1896 all the most dangerous chiefs had fled into Portuguese territory.[8, 9]

After the defeat of the Yao in Southern Nyasaland, Johnston at last was in a position to turn on the north end Arabs. Originally he had hoped that it might be possible to collaborate with the Arabs. By 1892, however, Johnston had come to the conclusion that they were the backbone of the slave trade and that in most cases it was impossible to turn them into agricultural producers.[10] In 1896 he

[1] Coupland, *op. cit.*, pp. 395–488.

[2] For negotiations between the F.O. and the BSAC see Johnston to Anderson 9th Feb. 1891 (F.O. 84/2140); BSAC, F.O. 13th Feb. 1891 (F.O. Print 617/1891); for the agreements see Command Paper C. 7637 of 1895. The best detailed account existing is Dr. Hanna, unpublished thesis in the keeping of the London Institute of Historical Research, "The History of Nyasaland 1875–1895", microfilmed copy in C.A.A.

[3] Johnston, F.O. 24th Nov. 1891 and 19th Dec. 1891, No. 19 (F.O. 84/2114).

[4] Johnston, F.O. 26th Dec. 1891, No. 27 (F.O. 84/2114).

[5] Johnston, F.O. 9th Dec. 1893, No. 63 (F.O. 2/55).

[6] Sharpe, F.O. 14th Feb. 1895, No. 19 (F.O. 2/88); Sharpe, F.O. 18th Feb. 1895, No. 20 *ibid.*

[7] Johnston, F.O. 2nd Oct. 1895, No. 117 (F.O. 2/89).

[8] Johnston, F.O. 6th Feb. 1896 (F.O. 2/1106).

[9] The principal dispatches have been published in the following Command Papers, dealing with the defeat of the slave traders, C. 6699 of 1892 (Africa No. 5), C. 7031 of 1893 (Africa No. 5), C. 8013 of 1896 (Africa No. 4), C. 7925 of 1896 (Africa No. 2).

[10] Johnston, F.O. 20th Feb. 1892, No. 7 (F.O. 84/2197).

launched a strong seaborne force with artillery against Mlozi, the principal Arab chief, and after heavy fighting Mlozi's powerful fortress was stormed, his slaves liberated, and he himself hanged.[1] Thus the most powerful Arab chieftaincy in the region was defeated, and the most important overland caravan route to the coast was closed. Before the destruction of Mlozi's dominion, little serious action had been taken against the Arabs in Northern Rhodesia,[2] as it had first been found necessary to secure the communications in Nyasaland. After the establishment of British rule in that territory, the task could be undertaken effectively. It amounted to little more than a number of police actions. These were based on a series of stations, Fife, Abercorn, Kalungwisi, which had been established from Lake Nyasa to Lake Tanganyika and Lake Mweru, originally as observation posts. In 1895 Dr. Watson, one of the officers of the British South Africa Company, took over the administration of Kilwa island on Lake Mweru, which had become the home of an Arab slave-trading chief.[3] From 1869 the police of the Company fought a series of small engagements against the Arabs,[4] and by the end of 1899 Commissioner Sharpe reported to the Foreign Office that the influence of the Arabs in North-Eastern Rhodesia had disappeared.[5]

The African associates in the trade similarly surrendered after small resistance. The defeat of Mlozi had made a great impression on the fierce Bemba. They were unable to agree on a united policy with regard to the European advance and split into a number of factions.[6] In 1896 Bishop Dupont, the head of the White Fathers Mission in the region, succeeded in getting a lodgement in the Bemba country. In 1899 he succeeded in penetrating into the country of Mwamba, the most powerful chief in the Bemba hierarchy below the Paramount. Dupont won a remarkable influence over his black flock as a preacher and reputed magician, and when Mwamba died, Dupont himself assumed lordship for a time.[7] His intervention at that critical stage precluded any concerted action which the Bemba might have undertaken against the forces of the British South Africa Company, the only thing that might have enabled them to keep their independence a little longer. After a few brushes with a number of malcontents, the Company's police

[1] Johnston, F.O. 16th Nov. 1895, No. 144 (F.O. 2/89), and Johnston, F.O. 3rd Jan. 1896, No. 1 (F.O. 2/106).

[2] Johnston, F.O. 11th May 1892, No. 19 (F.O. 84/2197).

[3] *British Central Africa Gazette*, 15th Aug. 1895; report Dr. Watson.

[4] Report J. Bell, 24th April 1896 (North-Eastern Rhodesia Public Records, C.A.A. 6/2/2). Report A. Drysdale, 25th June 1896 (*ibid.*). Report A. Drysdale, 1st Aug. 1896. Report J. Bell, 24th Nov. 1897 (*ibid.*). Report McKinnon, 14th March 1898 (*ibid.*). Report A. Young, 1897 (*ibid.*).

[5] Sharpe, F.O. 19th Dec. 1899 (F.O. 2/210).

[6] Report J. Bell, 16th Jan. 1896 (North-Eastern Rhodesia Public Records, 6/2/2).

[7] For a detailed account see Pineau, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–195.

quickly pacified the region in 1899.[1] In the same year an Imperial expedition from Nyasaland also forced Kazembe to surrender.[2] The power of the native participants in the slave trade thus disappeared at the same time as that of their Arab allies.

In 1898 an Imperial expedition from Nyasaland also destroyed the Ngoni kingdom of Mpeseni in the Fort Jameson region of Northern Rhodesia.[3] This exploit was made possible by the previous successes achieved against the slave traders in Nyasaland, which set free sufficient troops to deal with marauders like Mpeseni. It ended the last important independent political authority in the south of North-Eastern Rhodesia.

The British achieved their success, that of pacifying an enormous region stretching from the Shire river to Lake Tanganyika and Lake Mweru, with a force that was tiny. In 1898 Johnston listed the entire armed forces of Nyasaland as numbering only 1,200 men, nearly all Indians or Africans. This included everybody, hospital assistants, camp followers, interpreters, and even porters.[4] The police at the disposal of the Chartered Company were even fewer, so that the Company had to draw on Imperial troops in serious cases. Yet in Nyasaland, at least, the British were dealing with a determined and well-armed enemy. There were the Yao, skilfully fighting from behind cover, armed with muskets. There were the Arabs, strongly entrenched in their *tembes*, which commanded the main lines of communications, and armed more often than not with modern European breech-loaders.

However, the slave traders were completely incapable of combining against the common enemy. The north end allowed their Yao competitors in the south to be overthrown without moving a finger. And the Yao themselves usually failed to back one another. Even when some chiefs did make an attempt to combine against the British, there was little co-ordinated action and one chief confined himself to sending a witch-doctor at a critical period, who was to rouse the wild animals of the bush against the invaders.[5] Instead, the Yao quarrelled amongst themselves and at times even supported the British against one another.[6] Four years after the fighting had started they were even willing to march against their own countrymen in British uniform,[7] earning a well-merited reputation as reliable and stout soldiers. At the same time the British could rely on the Arab principality of Jumbe to support them on the

[1] *Central African Times*, 10th June 1899. R. Codrington, "Journey from Fort Jameson to old Chitambo", *Geographical Journal*, Vol. XV, March 1900, pp. 231–2.
[2] Codrington, BSAC 20th Dec. 1899 (BSAC Mins. 21st March 1900, anx. 101).
[3] Acting Commissioner Manning, F.O. 16th June 1898, No. 92, encl. Cpt. Brake Manning (F.O. 2/147).
[4] Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 152, Appendix 1.
[5] Johnston, F.O. 2nd Oct. 1895, No. 117 (F.O. 2/89).
[6] Johnston, F.O. 13th Jan. 1895, No. 139 (*ibid.*).
[7] Johnston, F.O. 2nd Oct. 1895, No. 117 (*ibid.*).

west coast of Lake Nyasa. Jumbe himself was threatened by the Yao [1] and it also appears that Jumbe was the only genuine colonist amongst the Arabs, interested in agriculture as much as in trade.[2] In any case the local chiefs in his principality were strong enough to oppose the party of Arab coast-men who were willing to risk a fight.[3] Perhaps more important still was the fact that everywhere the original Nyanja population, whom the Yao had subjugated, loyally stood by the side of the British even during their most serious reverses.[4]

On the British side the key to victory lay in two things: Sikhs and sea-power. Sikhs, who were able to stand the climate better than European troops and who were far cheaper to maintain, formed the backbone of Johnston's force. They supplied that element of discipline which local levies lacked and gave the necessary stiffening to the whole force.[5] Sea-power, in the shape of a little squadron of Imperial gunboats, on the other hand, made it possible to control the route across the lake. It made up for any lack of numbers and the difficulties in the way of communications by enabling Johnston suddenly to throw large concentrations of forces against such an enemy as Makanjira or Mlozi, and it also supplied a floating artillery against an enemy ashore that could not be touched by return enemy fire. Johnston, a most able and resourceful amateur soldier, who (like Cromwell) had never had a formal military training, grasped the importance of these two factors from the very beginning, and he carried through the main campaigns to their successful conclusion, despite all military and political obstacles in his way. The shape which the operations thus assumed established an important difference between early Nyasaland on the one hand and Southern Rhodesia on the other. It had been a mounted burgher force that had conquered Southern Rhodesia. The settlers themselves had won the Matabele War, with relatively small help from the Imperial Government.[6] They had vanquished an enemy who relied on the open tactics of the spear crescent, who was helpless against rifle and machine-gun fire and who possessed few firearms, having never seriously tried to trade captives for guns, but either murdered or assimilated them. In Nyasaland events had taken a different course. The settler element, in the shape of the African Lakes Company, had been incapable of dislodging the Arabs, with their breech-loaders. They were neither numerous enough nor sufficiently well armed to take the country on their own. In two subsequent operations the settlers again only played a very minor part. The same was true in Northern Rhodesia during the Ngoni War when the settler element, the few employees of the North

[1] Johnston, F.O. 23rd Oct. 1893, No. 61 (F.O. 2/55).
[2] Johnston, F.O. 20th Feb. 1892 (F.O. Print 84/2197 of 1892).
[3] Major Edwards to Johnston, 17th July 1894 (F.O. 2/67).
[4] Johnston, F.O. 10th May 1892, No. 18 (F.O. 84/2197).
[5] For an appreciation of the Indian soldier by Johnston, see C. 7504, p. 31.
[6] For an account of the Matabele War see Hole, *op. cit.*, pp. 299–329.

Charterland Concession Company, never took any serious part in the fighting. The fact that the region north of the Zambezi was not conquered by settler forces seriously affected the strength of the settler as against the Imperial element in the far north.

In North-Western Rhodesia the slave trade continued somewhat longer. In 1894, after lengthy negotiations, the Foreign Office handed over Northern Rhodesia to the direct administration of the Company.[1] The Company then took over the few administrative stations, such as Fife and Abercorn, which Johnston had established as Imperial Commissioner along the eastern fringe of the Chartered Territory. He administered this territory on the Company's behalf from 1891 onwards.[2] However, the British South Africa Company did not attempt to make its power effective over the vast expanse of bush that covered most of North-Western Rhodesia. It had too many other obligations. Unlike the older "African Lakes Company", it was not interested in trade, and it had, therefore, no incentive to push on into the interior in search of ivory and rubber. Neither was it associated with missionary interests. Its object was to guide British capital into mining and other capital investments in Rhodesia. The Company had been formed in 1889 at a time when Britain no longer lent to Continental countries to the same extent as formerly, but when British investors had realized—from the 'seventies onwards—the possibilities of investments in colonial and overseas territories.[3] But the Company's investments in the first place lay south of the Zambezi. The copper resources to the north were hardly known. The gold of the Transvaal and of Southern Rhodesia could be worked immediately. It was thus in the south that the Company made its first major efforts, fighting the Matabele War in 1893, later becoming engaged in the Jameson Raid, and finally being forced to suppress a major African revolt in Southern Rhodesia in 1896. In consequence it had at first neither the time nor the money to devote much attention to its distant and speculative possessions in the "far north". In North-Eastern Rhodesia it confined itself at first to maintaining the few posts that Johnston had set up. In the north-west it did not even maintain a Resident with King Lewanika in Barotseland.

It was only in 1897 that the Company's first permanent representative took up residence in Barotseland, seven years after the first treaty had been concluded with Lewanika. A year later the first detachment of police set out from the south across the Zambezi into North-Western Rhodesia.[4] A year later Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., a company financially linked to the British South Africa Company, started prospecting seriously for copper along the

[1] C. 7637 of 1895. [2] *Ibid.*

[3] S. H. Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa, its Course and Effects*, Oxford University Press, London (1938), pp. 16–30, 52–106.

[4] Cpt. Drury to O.C. British South Africa Police, 22nd Nov. 1898, encl. in High Commissioner Butler, C.O. 18th Jan. 1899, No. 56 (African S. 574).

northern border of the territory and in the Congo Free State.[1] For the first time European interests had thus become directed to that part of Central Africa.

Despite the late start, the task of pacifying the west was in some ways simpler than it was in the east. For one thing, the Administration could rely on the support of a well-organized and comparatively powerful native state in the suppression of the slave trade, a state which moreover disliked Portuguese encroachments along its western border. Secondly the " Mambari ", with their lack of political ambitions, did not possess the fighting mettle of the Arabs and coast-men from the east. Their suppression was merely a matter of establishing police stations from which patrols would issue forth. The first of these, Kasempa, was established in 1901 [2] and police action was quickly expanded. In 1905 the King of Italy settled by arbitration a long-standing dispute between Great Britain and Portugal over the exact extent of the western boundary of Northern Rhodesia.[3] Once this question was settled, patrols could enter into previously doubtful territory without provoking diplomatic complications. At the same time the slave trade was coming to an end in Portuguese territory itself. In 1902 the Portuguese launched an expedition against the Bailundu, and began to assert their authority effectively in the interior of Angola. Nine years later a terrible famine also struck the slave-trading Ovimbundu. Besides rubber fell in price, as the great plantations of the East Indies started competing with native rubber. All this disorganized trade. The slave trade was further undermined by the building of the Benguella railway from the west coast to the Congo from 1902 onwards. This did away with the need for slave porters. Finally Portugal became a republic in 1910 and the tempo of reform quickened. Slaves were freed and repatriated from the cocoa islands, and the old abuses came to an end.[4] By 1912 the last caravans disappeared. Ten years later the Administration felt itself strong enough to control strictly the possession of firearms by Africans throughout the whole of Northern Rhodesia.[5] This measure had already been taken in the north-east in 1901,[6] and its universal application marked the final pacification of the country.

5. Conclusion

In the course of this paper an attempt has been made to point out some of the general characteristics of the slave trade. It stood

[1] *Rhodesian Mining Journal*, May 1928, pp. 157–9; Oct. 1928, p. 301.
[2] Col. Harding Report, 3rd Nov. 1901, No. 61 (African S. 702).
[3] C. 2548 of 1905.
[4] G. M. Childs, *op. cit.*, pp. 210–14.
[5] *N. Rhodesia Gazette*, 6th Jan. 1923, High Commissioner's Proclamation No. 21 of 1922, dated 21st Dec. 1922.
[6] *British Central Africa Gazette*, 31st Jan. 1901, Government Notice No. 4 of 1901, dated 5th Jan. 1901.

for a different civilization from Europe, it constituted a rival form of political power, and it maintained an economic system opposed to the European system of wage labour. The slave trade in fact was the original form of labour migration in Africa. Before it was suppressed, the new form of labour migration, enforced by the signed contract and the tax receipt instead of the slave trader's musket, could not come into existence. Without this, European economic penetration and the effective exploitation of the resources of the territory would not have been feasible. Victory thus meant the beginning of European rule and settlement. The former distinction between those who had raided and those who had been the victims began to disappear. Instead a unified wage-labour force could come into existence with interests and aspirations very different from those of the tribal warriors who had been their ancestors.

It also seems clear that the pattern of the slave trade was determined to a considerable extent by the attitude of the locally dominant tribes. This in turn depended on a multitude of factors which are difficult to disentangle from the very limited historical sources available. It is, however, highly probable that the attitudes of the tribes were determined to some degree by their respective economic structures, and historians may find it useful to investigate the question further. Tribes with complex economies requiring many labourers with different skills probably reacted differently to the stimulus of the slave trade than did tribes with undifferentiated economies. The former were more likely to wish to import men with different skills into their country, rather than export them. In addition there were ecological factors. A tribe inhabiting a fertile country, but one not densely populated, were more likely to wish to retain their captives to build up their manpower resources. Tribes on very poor soil, on the other hand, had far fewer incentives to retain their captives, for they could not feed them so easily. Again it was important whether a tribe possessed an exportable surplus other than human beings and possessed the means of taking it to the coast without slave porters. There were the requirements of the tribe itself. Some tribes felt the need for guns. Others had worked out a set of military tactics depending on home-made weapons which seemed so perfect, both for the chase and for warfare, that there seemed no need to acquire new, outlandish weapons. Victory or defeat in battle determined the success or the failure in slave trading. These in their turn generally depended on the general economy of the people. A tribe of expert game-hunters could easily become expert man-hunters. A tribe depending on cattle for their livelihood had the inestimable advantage in warfare of being tied down less to local resources in their expeditions. An agricultural people on the other hand was limited in the range of its operations by the amount of food its warriors could either carry or loot on the way.

But not all factors were of an economic kind. The nature of the

political organization of the state was also of vital importance, for a strongly organized state was in a much better position for raiding scattered and weak communities. The Bemba in North-Eastern Rhodesia possessed such a state. Yet their economic techniques differed little from those of other matrilineal tribes in the territory who practised the same slash-and-burn agriculture, but who were nevertheless incapable of defending themselves against the Bemba menace.

In considering this and other historical problems of Africa at the time of the European conquest it is always important to keep in mind that the Africans were not just a mass of black undifferentiated savages. It is often tempting for the historian to make assumptions of that nature for his sources are mostly writings of missionaries who tended to see only vice and degradation around them or they are reports of officers and officials who conquered the Africans and often considered them all equally unfit to rule themselves. Nevertheless there was clearly a considerable degree of political and economic differentiation amongst the tribes which was of historical significance. In addition, the historian should remember that economic change in Africa did not start with the coming of the Europeans. The slave trade for instance had already greatly altered life. It not only led to warfare and bloodshed, but it also introduced new goods such as cloth, beads and other luxuries and tools like guns. Finally vast political changes, associated with the new economic forces, were obviously in progress before the White man arrived. The slave trader brought guns the possession of which gave proportionately great advantages to a gang leader or a chief, and altered the general balance within the tribe. In time the importation of gunpowder led to the creation of upstart empires like that of the adventurer Msidi in the Congo. European conquest gave an enormous impetus to social change in Africa, but it did not create it, for African social institutions were not static. The slave trade was one of the factors that was both influenced by and in turn was modifying these institutions. This paper does not attempt to give a full explanation of their relations towards one another, but it may at least indicate their complexity.

BOOK REVIEW

Sukuma Law and Custom. By HANS CORY. London: Oxford University Press for International African Institute. Pp. 194 [map]. 18*s.*

THE recognition of "Native Law and Custom" has long been a feature of British Colonial Administration in Africa. It may strike some as strange, therefore, that so few studies should be available in the field of customary law. More recently, however, the changes overtaking African society have focussed attention on the problems involved in the development of tribal law, and this has given rise to the feeling that this body of law ought to be recorded.

The most recent attempt at such a record is *Sukuma Law and Custom*, by Hans Cory, Government Sociologist in the Tanganyika Administration.

The Sukuma people, who number roughly one million, inhabit a large area of Tanganyika to the south of Lake Victoria. They are grouped into chiefdoms which even today seem to have considerable local autonomy, though they are linked within the framework of a wider Federation. In the past there appears to have been wide variation in custom between one chiefdom and another, and it has been part of Mr. Cory's task to effect a unification of the customary law.

The work itself falls into three main sections, in which are treated respectively the Law of Persons, covering marriage and related issues, The Law of Property, and the Law of Succession. Each section consists of brief, numbered statements of rules of law, interspersed with explanatory notes. Thus, from the section on divorce we have:

> 201. Desertion by a wife is grounds for divorce.

Or again, in the section on trusteeship, we find:

> 474. If an animal disappears the owner cannot make the trustee responsible for the loss unless he can prove that the trustee has stolen or slaughtered the beast.
>
> 475. If a trustee uses cattle for payment of bridewealth, the owner has the right to enforce the return of the cattle regardless of the legal consequences for the married couple.

These examples have been taken to illustrate Mr. Cory's method. It is not one that makes for easy reading; but the author has explained that the book is intended for use in Native Courts and European Courts of Appeal. Its purpose has determined its character and arrangement. How far it has succeeded in achieving this purpose must therefore be left to those who have to administer

the record to decide. Nevertheless, one may be permitted to wonder whether some of the statements of Sukuma Law may not be misleading to a European judge lacking intimate knowledge of the workings of an African court. For example, paragraph 201 quoted above is undoubtedly a correct statement of the customary law. But the European judge is likely to interpret this in terms of his own technical concept of grounds of divorce, and to assume that a divorce may only be granted if the proper grounds have been made out. However it is clear from a case quoted in a later section (p. 84) that a Sukuma court may grant a divorce to a petitioner " without [the latter] giving any grounds for his demand ".

For the anthropologist, however, the book is open to a more serious criticism. Mr. Cory is primarily concerned with the statement of norms: but there is nowhere any attempt to link these norms within a system so as to bring out their relationship to one another, and thus give them meaning. They appear to exist *in vacuo*, without reference to other aspects of the Sukuma social system. Moreover, the life of the law lies in the way in which these norms are applied to specific situations, and it is through the analysis of such situations that we may come to an understanding of underlying legal principles. Thus as a statement of law it may be perfectly correct that if a trustee of cattle uses them for bride-wealth the owner may enforce their return irrespective of the legal consequences for the married couple (para. 475). Yet one is doubtful if a Sukuma court would deal with the case in such legalistic terms. In the reviewer's experience, an African court would take a much broader view of the situation, and would look to the relationship of the parties, their motivation, and so on in an attempt to restore amity between the parties. Mr. Cory is fully aware of this, for he notes (p. 26) that in certain cases " litigation between close relatives is made as difficult as possible by the court functionaries, as the fact of having made the family quarrel public will itself *militate against later reconciliation* " (my italics). His treatment, however, tends to obscure what is a fundamental feature of the judicial process, and therefore of customary law.

In his Foreword, Mr. J. P. Moffett, Local Courts Adviser, looks forward to the time when it will be possible to set out the broad principles underlying Bantu law, and stresses the need for further intensive and comparative study. It is submitted here that fruitful comparisons can only emerge when the rules of law are understood, and given their significance, in terms of the social system.

A. L. Epstein.

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